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Restorative Retributivism
BRIAN M. MURRAY*
The current criminal justice moment is ripe for discussion of first principles. What the criminal law is, what it
should do, and why society punishes is as relevant as ever as
communities reconsider the reach of the criminal law and
forms of punishment like incarceration. One theory recently
put forth—reconstructivism—purports to offer a descriptive
and normative theory of the criminal law and punishment
while critiquing the ills of the American system. It comprehends the criminal law and punishment as functional endeavors, with the particular goal of restitching or “reconstructing” the social fabric that crime disrupts. In particular, reconstructivism is a social theory of the criminal law,
prioritizing solidarity rather than a moral conception of the
common good. Drawing from a line of thinkers, from Aristotle to Hegel to Durkheim, reconstructivism claims to be distinctive and uniquely equipped to explain what the criminal
law is and what it should do, as opposed to retributivist or
utilitarian based theories. It claims to more richly account
for the social effects of punishment that plague the current
*
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system, unlike duty-based theories of retribution and the
cold instrumentality underlying utilitarian-based punishment that has made criminal justice impersonal and shortsighted.
This Article critiques reconstructivism’s core claims and
presents an alternative theory of punishment that contains
insights for the current moment. While reconstructivism critiques the failures of common punishment theories to account for the social nature and effects of punishment, it fails
to account for forms of retributivism that are not deontological. In particular, teleological retributivism, or more simply
phrased, “restorative retributivism,” already contains the
descriptively and normatively restorative elements present
in reconstructivism. Its conception of the common good rests
on the inherently social nature of human affairs and accounts for the solidarity prioritized by reconstructivism.
Whereas the reconstructivist prioritizes the socially and culturally constituted, the restorative retributivist seeks to emphasize shared moral intuitions, which social realities inform, but not to the exclusion of other considerations.
This distinction has implications for how each theory
might critique modern criminal law and punishment. For example, restorative retributivism would view the expansion of
the criminal law—both in terms of substance and administration—skeptically, and the modern approach to punishment—both in theory and its carceral form—as contrary to
human dignity and too focused on controlling risk rather
than promoting individual and social flourishing. This critique, like reconstructivism, has much to offer in the era of
the carceral state and can help to reorient punishment to the
broader good. It shifts the focus away from control and risk
management to dignity and flourishing, leaving room for
community involvement, humility in judging, and de-criminalization. In sum, reconstructivism and restorative retributivism are relatives, and both helpfully emphasize the social
implications and consequences of the criminal law and punishment.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are sitting in a courtroom during the sentencing
hearing for a criminal defendant who recently pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance. You do not know his name and the
judge only saw him for the first time a few weeks ago during a plea
hearing that took less than fifteen minutes. You learn that the defendant has a history of substance abuse and has been convicted of
previous drug crimes and minor property offenses connected to his
condition.1 While issues relating to the substance of the charge could
have been defeated at trial, his peers neither saw his face nor heard
the case.2 The defendant took the plea deal because it was closer to
a sure bet, although a bet nevertheless, because now here he is waiting to be sentenced by a judge he’s never met or seen in the community and who has seen her courtroom flooded by countless cases
like this a week. The judge is no stranger to the epidemic of drug
1

Of course, this story is far too common given the social realities relating to
substance abuse and the ever-expanding usage of the criminal law to penalize drug
use or behavior intertwined with it.
2
Jury trials almost never happen in lower-level cases, not to mention any
cases, and defendants are rarely tried by their peers. See LAURA I. APPLEMAN,
DEFENDING THE JURY: CRIME, COMMUNITY, AND THE CONSTITUTION 3 (2015);
WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 39 (2011);
John Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal Criminal Defendants Go to Trial, and Most
Who Do Are Found Guilty, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 11, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-federal-criminal-defendants-go-totrial-and-most-who-do-are-found-guilty/.
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use pervading her county and the nation at large.3 Cookie cutter sentencing has become inevitable, churned out in the machinery of the
criminal justice system.4
Over the course of a decade, the defendant has cycled in and out
of county jails, receiving little treatment and few moments of short
and long-term guidance, and some of those programs just seemed to
perpetuate stigma. Sadly, the story is all too common,5 making assembly-line sentencings even more impersonal6 and reifying some
of the judge’s instincts about harsh sentencing.7 The sentencing
guidelines in front of the judge suggest a guideline range.8 They are
built from risk assessment instruments9 that theoretically seek to
mitigate potential harm to the community while imprisoning only
the most dangerous.10 Those guidelines quantify the man in front of
you and the judge, and the conversation that occurs out loud between
the prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge focuses almost entirely
on the potential for more harm.11 It appears that the risk assessment
will lead to quite the harsh sentence.12 After the suggested period of
incarceration, a lengthy period of parole awaits, where the funding
for transition programs will remain small, the obstacles to reentry
significant, and the opportunities for setbacks persistent.13 The
whole process seems desensitized, a world of cold, impersonal
3

See Understanding the Epidemic, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html (last visited May 15, 2021); NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH &
CASEY ANDERSON, OPIOIDS: TREATING AN ILLNESS, ENDING A WAR 7–8, 17
(2017).
4
See STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 19 (2012).
5
BIBAS, supra note 4, at 19–20.
6
See id. at 19.
7
See Erin R. Collins, The Problem of Problem-Solving Courts, 54 UC DAVIS
L. REV. 1573, 1594 (2021).
8
Collins, supra note 7, at 18–19.
9
Brandon Garrett & John Monahan, Assessing Risk: The Use of Risk Assessment in Sentencing, JUDICATURE, Summer 2019, https://judicature.duke.edu/articles/assessing-risk-the-use-of-risk-assessment-in-sentencing/. The usage of risk
assessment tools during sentencing is frequent. Id.
10
See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09(3) (AM. L. NST. PROPOSED
FINAL DRAFT 2017).
11
Collins, supra note 7, at 1616–17.
12
Id. at 1594.
13
See Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of Recidivism, 104 GEO. L.J. 291, 295 (2016).
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justice, where individuals get lost. And you, as a member of the
community, are on the sidelines.
As you watch the judge, questions flood your mind. What is actually happening here? Should the judge seek to keep the community
(and the defendant) as safe as possible by preventing future drug
use? Exact vengeance on behalf of a community or victims (when
they exist), or punish out of a sense of duty?14 Is communicating that
wrongdoing has occurred, and that the social norms underlying the
community persist despite that reality, most important?15 Or should
the potential for personal development and flourishing, and its relationship to the common good, drive the decision?16 Can punishment
restore and do justice? When deciding whether punishing is appropriate in these circumstances for this defendant, what form should it
take and what is the central question being considered? What should
the question be? Is there a way to simultaneously explain the real
function of the criminal law and punishment and why they reach
where they do? Where should they stop?
When it comes to these questions, which have been addressed
by countless legal scholars and philosophical thinkers,17 there is a
newcomer: reconstructivism.18 This theory purportedly accounts for
the function of criminal law by operating as an explanation of what
criminal law does and what it should do.19 Its descriptive plus normative feature is said to offer more than punishment theories linked

14

Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful,
Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 145, 147–48 (2008).
15
See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 25
(1988).
16
See Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1493, 1532 (2016).
17
See AXEL HONNETH, THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION 7–13 (Joel Anderson trans., Polity Press 1995) (1992) (discussing varied philosophical opinions on
subject). Of course, there is no way to catalogue the entirety of these previous
discussions, which have lasted for millennia, in a law review article. See id.
18
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1487. Reconstructivism is the synthesis of
decades of thought put forth by plenty of scholars, whether they labeled themselves reconstructivist or not. Id. Newcomer, of course, might be misleading in
this context.
19
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1489–90.
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to retributivism or utilitarianism.20 Reconstructivism claims to
thread the needle by providing a theoretical rationale for the three
big concerns of the criminal law: meting out justice, ensuring public
safety,21 and identifying what is worthy of condemnation.22 Put
simply, in an era where the line between the civil and criminal is
graying,23 it attempts to make sense of why the criminal law is distinctive, and why punishment is necessary and worth it after all.24
While reconstructivism has components that resemble retributivism, utilitarianism, and expressivism, it also claims none of these
at its core.25 Instead, reconstructivism is a socially oriented theory
of the criminal law and punishment, paying careful attention to prioritizing the “restitching” of the social order in the wake of crime.26
Its contribution is that it brings a telos back into play, but a peculiarly social one, that is especially cognizant of the developing social
realities that inform culture, which in turn informs law.27
This has important social implications for the current criminal
justice moment. The reconstructivist claims to simultaneously justify the existence of the criminal law and provide a powerful critique
of the American system’s key features and failures, and one that is
unique in its emphasis on the social undercurrents of the criminal
law and why our system fails.28 It offers a theory that attempts to
make sense of the condemnation that comes with criminal law, and
judge that same project, both revealing the good and the warts.29
Where, precisely, when compared to previous theories of punishment, does reconstructivism fit? Whereas reconstructivism
20

Id. at 1534–37. This is in contrast to arguments against a comprehensive
theory of the criminal law and punishment. See Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2477, 2487–
88 (1997); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL
THEORY 5–12 (1999).
21
See PETER KARL KORITANSKY, THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE PHILOSOPHY
OF PUNISHMENT 100 (2012).
22
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1491–92.
23
Jenny Roberts, Gundy and the Civil-Criminal Divide, 17 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 207, 207–08 (2019).
24
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1542–47.
25
Id. at 1523–34.
26
See id. at 1500, 1529.
27
See id. at 1490.
28
See id. at 1490, 1494–95.
29
See id. at 1490.
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claims “descriptive” and “normative” independence,30 this Article
argues that it closely aligns with earlier versions of retributivism that
are not of the Kantian, deontological variety31 that have been juxtaposed with reconstructivism. Hence, the core of the reconstructivist
claim—its connection to teleology and an underlying philosophical
system32—is timely in that it reintroduces the concept of telos, but
not one of a kind. Retributivism has a long history before Kant,33
and that long history contains strands that also contain the core insights of reconstructivism and might even share its critique of modern criminal justice issues. And earlier forms of retributivism actually align relatively well with the findings of modern social science
about shared intuitions of justice.34 The fact that those shared intuitions exist meets Cass Sunstein’s standard for the criminal law,
namely that unless a “plausible foundation in widely shared moral
commitments”35 exists, due process might be at issue. Frustration
with the current machinery of criminal justice is widespread,36 and
many agree that serious reform is in order.
Put more clearly, while reconstructivism revives the connection
between teleology and punishment,37 it is not the only theory of punishment that connects to the idea of telos. Rather, this older form of
retributivism does the same, understanding punishment as a function
of the relational nature of human reality that supports the moral

30

See id. at 1490–91.
Id. at 1527.
32
See id. at 1490.
33
See, e.g., Peter Koritansky, Two Theories of Retributive Punishment: Immanuel Kant and Thomas Aquinas, 22 HIST. PHIL. Q. 319, 319 (2005).
34
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for
Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 24–32 (2007) (contrasting
“empirical desert” with vigilantism). For example, the work of Paul Robinson and
John Darley has repeatedly conveyed how shared intuitions relating to punishment in fact exist. Id. 66–67 These findings have led to a theory of “empirical
desert” to allow desert as a distributive principle to become more practicable than
vengeful or deontological theories of desert put forth by thinkers like Kant. See
id. at 24; Robinson, supra note 14, at 145–46.
35
Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude,
Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 73 (2003).
36
See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 3–10 (2011);
BIBAS, supra note 4, at 27; STUNTZ, supra note 2, at 31–36.
37
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1527.
31
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order underlying the criminal law.38 Just like reconstructivism, that
retributivism is about restitching the order that was transgressed by
a criminal violation.39 That order is both moral and social. More accurately, the social is inherently intertwined with the moral because
a robust notion of human flourishing, where both are interwoven,
underlies the idea of punishment.40 It is a relational retributivism
where desert entails the individual and the social, and by definition
it is restorative. It is most definitely not the Kantian—or deontological41—retributivism that has been harshly criticized for centuries.
In a word, it is personalist.42 And it predates modern studies that
link default punishment motives held by community members to notions of moral outrage in addition to the reaffirmation of community
norms.43 It is a restorative retributivism.
This Article offers two contributions: a taxonomical critique of
reconstructivism and the presentation of an alternative form of retributivism that can help crystallize the purposes of the criminal justice system. It proceeds in four parts. In Part I, it will describe reconstructivism as presented. This Part does not, and cannot, contain
all that was presented in Professor Josh Kleinfeld’s introduction of
reconstructivism in the Harvard Law Review;44 however, it aims to
highlight the key components he laid out.45 Part II pinpoints the classifying label given to reconstructivism, paying careful attention to
the particular type of retributivism juxtaposed with reconstructivism. Part III will present a different strand of retributivism that is
premised on teleology rather than deontological ethics. This retributivism shares the Aristotelian roots of reconstructivism but finds its
development through ancient and medieval philosophers rather than

38

See id. at 1526–27.
See id. at 1538 (acknowledging retributivism’s goals include restitching
order but concluding reconstructivism accomplishes this goal better).
40
See id. at 1493.
41
See Koritansky, supra note 33, at 319, 323; Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at
1527.
42
See CHRISTIAN SMITH, WHAT IS A PERSON? RETHINKING HUMANITY,
SOCIAL LIFE, AND THE MORAL GOOD FROM THE PERSON UP 406–08 (2010).
43
See John M. Darley et al., Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives for
Punishment, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 677 (2000).
44
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16.
45
Id. Any errors in understanding reconstructivism are, of course, my own.
39
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Hegel.46 Some of those thinkers were informed by religious faith,
but the theory remains philosophical rather than religious.47 Its influence on well-known components of criminal law has been
demonstrated by scholars like James Whitman.48 Its embers remain,
but its light has been dimmed in a political-legal regime with classical liberal premises, although its implications have been discussed
by some recent scholars.49 Most importantly, it is not fundamentally
deontological, meaning it contains more flexibility in application to
particular criminal justice issues, and is more aware of the social
consequences of punishment. That flexibility also makes its practice
open to locally, democratic administration, allowing communities to
pursue justice from the ground up without destroying relationships
forever. These attributes are why it might be called “restorative retributivism,” and why its insights might be helpful given the widespread desire for social justice in the criminal law.

46

HONNETH, supra note 17, at 7, 11–30.
See id. at 7. Teleological retributivism has been developed by religious
thinkers, building from Aristotelian premises. Id.; see Paul Russell, Hume on Responsibility and Punishment, 20 CAMBRIDGE U. PRESS 539, 545 (1990).
48
See James Q. Whitman, The Transition to Modernity, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 84, 85–86 (Markus D. Dubber & Tatjana Horn
eds., 2014) (arguing that “modern criminal justice” has historical origins in canon
and Church-inspired medieval law); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF
REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 2–7 (2008);
see also ANDREW SKOTNICKI, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 11
(2008) (tracing historical understanding of retribution, with restorative and prosocial intentions, as traditional purpose of criminal law); David McIlroy, Christianity, mens rea and the Boundaries of Criminal Liability, in CHRISTIANITY AND
THE CRIMINAL LAW 117 (2020).
49
See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 69; John M. Finnis, Retribution: Punishment’s Formative Aim, 44 AM. J. JURIS. 91, 97 (1999); Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications for
the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2183–84 (2001) (discussing “confrontational conception” of retribution and its relational nature); Dan
Markel, Retributive Justice and the Demands of Democratic Citizenship, 1 VA. J.
CRIM. L. 1, 5, 10 (2012); Andrew Skotnicki, Foundations Once Destroyed: The
Catholic Church and Criminal Justice, 65 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 792, 792, 796
(2004); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1425
(1995); Whitman, supra note 48, at 84–96 (describing theological and philosophical premises in pre-modernity and how they affected development of reasonable
doubt rule).
47
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Part IV compares and contrasts these two theories.50 This comparison indicates that reconstructivism might be classified as a
strand of this retributivism, but one that focuses more on the social
activities of humans rather than the moral to define the purpose; at
the very least, they are close relatives.51 Whereas the thinkers at their
origin52 and some first premises might be different,53 they both end
up in very similar places when it comes to the question of how punishment relates to the broader social order.54 The social solidarity
that reconstructivism prioritizes is, to use Professor Kleinfeld’s
terms, “embedded” in the concept of desert within restorative retributivism, which presumes a transcendence to relationships between
individuals in a community, culminating in a concept of the common good that recognizes the inextricable connection between the
social and the moral.55 That social solidarity not only has philosophical roots in Aristotle’s concepts of eudaimonia and the flourishing
of the community,56 it has been validated by shared intuitions of
50
To be clear, I am not the creator of this theory of retributivism. I am merely
situating it next to reconstructivism to compare their core claims. And as mentioned above, I am indebted to several philosophical thinkers who have clearly
discussed and critiqued it. All errors in my representation of the theory’s development and core claims, as well as those scholars’ contributions, are, of course,
my own.
51
See infra Part IV.
52
See HONNETH, supra note 17, at 7–30; KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 70.
Augustine and Thomas Aquinas have very different philosophical systems than
Hegel, but interestingly, Aquinas and Hegel both acknowledge Aristotelian influence on their work. See HONNETH, supra note 17, at 7–30; Shawn Floyd, Thomas
Aquinas: Moral Philosophy, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://iep.
utm.edu/aq-moral/; Augustine (354–430 C.E.), INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL,
https://iep.utm.edu/augustin/.
53
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1529; Finnis, supra note 49, at 97–99. For
example, Professor Kleinfeld describes the social emotions, impulses, and practices that underlie reconstructivism, while John Finnis has described the finite
goods and practical reason that underlies retributivism. See Kleinfeld, supra note
16, at 1529; Finnis, supra note 49, at 97–99.
54
Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1529.
55
Id. at 1492, 1544.
56
The closest English word for the Ancient Greek term eudaimonia is probably “flourishing.” See Ethics Explainer: Eudaimonia, ETHICS CENTRE (Aug. 4,
2016), https://ethics.org.au/ethics-explainer-eudaimonia/. Or, to use Aristotelian
terms, the polis. HONNETH, supra note 17, at 7, 11–30; see Kleinfeld, supra note
16, at 1493 n.11.
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justice underlying the concept of “empirical desert.”57 The major
distinction between the two theories seems to be that restorative retributivism has a more static notion of the common good. Arguably,
that notion is richer given its perceptions beyond the social and empirically verifiable.
Part V focuses on the upshot of this philosophical classification
and some of the insights that restorative retributivism can bring to
current discussions about the criminal justice system. Retributivism,
while revived over the past several decades, has been under fire for
centuries as too “mystical” and impractical, and too close to the
vengeful.58 Concepts of desert are viewed as indecipherable and
thereby not useful, making risk assessment tools even more appealing.59 To be fair, vengeful and deontological theories of desert struggle to provide clear responses to social ills connected to punishment.
Proponents of empirical desert, like Paul Robinson, have fought
back against the notion that retribution is a concept forever lost, using modern methods to validate desert as the basis of punishment
and to convey its practicability.60 Nevertheless, this age is one where
the language of risk and control pervade discussions of criminal justice, leading to incapacitation and inequitable outcomes. Reconstructivism is a response to that trend, emphasizing the social utility
of the criminal law to construct a powerful critique of the current
criminal justice moment.
Part V demonstrates how restorative retributivism does the
same, but with a richer understanding of purpose that is restorative
on more than one level. Reconstructivism is arguably more democratic and less fixed,61 leaving room for development in democratic
society. But restorative retributivism is more stable given its openness to fixed roots in the natural order, providing the constraints that
prevent the worst democratic impulses (e.g., incapacitation and incarceration run amok, which is currently a huge problem)62 from
57

Robinson & Darley, supra note 34, at 18.
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1515.
59
See Koritansky, supra note 33, at 323–24.
60
See Robinson & Darley, supra note 34, at 18–19.
61
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1552–55.
62
Sharon Dolovich, Creating the Permanent Prisoner, in LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY? 96, 98–100 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr.
& Austin Sarat eds., 2012).
58
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doing injustice and punitive excess, something not necessarily
barred by reconstructivism itself.63 It also preserves spaces for local
communities to make decisions, something the current criminal justice system is poor at accomplishing64 given its well-known slide
into insider-based decision-making.65 It is synergistic with shared
notions of punitive justice held by laypersons, making it cognizable
in the modern day, and potentially disruptive of plea-bargaining
norms and other streamlined practices that are impersonal. At the
same time, it relies on the hard work of prudent individuals to implement66—an aspiration most have for government, but a real challenge given the current moment. In short, restorative retributivism
would shift the focus of the criminal law and punishment towards
the question of human flourishing rather than the mitigation of risk
or efficient social control.
In the end, reconstructivism and this version of retributivism are
natural partners in reorienting and enriching debates about the criminal law, and they should be viewed as such as conversations about
criminal justice reform evolve. They are not that far apart and, at the
very least, give forceful reason for reflecting on how what binds the
“social fabric” should always be a focus of criminal justice reform.
I.
WHAT IS RECONSTRUCTIVISM?
Reconstructivism is a theory of criminal law nestled within sociological philosophy.67 Its philosophical forefather is Hegel, and its
sociological parent Durkheim.68 Its first principle is that “social
practices and institutions” are the way they are because of values
that subsist within them.69 This is the origin of the phrase, the “embodied ethical life,” which holds ethical values are organically
63

This point was conceded by Professor Kleinfeld in his Article when he recognized that retributive side constraints might be necessary to prevent reconstructivism from being too relativistic. See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1529 n.122.
64
See infra Part V (referring to Stuntz’s work on loss of local administration
of criminal law that allows law to be simultaneously relational and justice-oriented).
65
APPLEMAN, supra note 2, at 3.
66
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1564–65.
67
See id. at 1494, 1549, 1556–57.
68
See id. at 1487.
69
See id.
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contained within social realities.70 Studying these social practices
and institutions thereby reveals the normative order already at work,
allowing for the ability to critique those norms.
How does this premise relate to the criminal law, or better yet,
the reconstructive approach to criminal law? Reconstructivism posits that the criminal law and punishment make sense because they
represent the way that society responds to attacks on the socially
embodied ethical life within a community.71 In short, punishment
defends against wrongdoing and reinforces the social fabric underlying the normative order, which necessarily entails certain values
held in common, and developed socially.72 Reconstructivism is thus
primarily a social theory of criminal law rather than a metaphysical
or logically ethical one. The utility of the criminal law comes from
its ability to support social norms.73 Professor Kleinfeld states that:
[C]riminal law has a distinctive role to play in the
social world, a function that gives it a different center
from other areas of law, because criminal law is the
primary legal institution by which a community reconstructs the moral basis of its social order, its ethical life, in the wake of an attack on that ethical life.74
Criminal law protects against wrongdoing that denies the reality of
the ethically imbued social order.75 The reconstruction of socio-ethical norms transgressed by wrongdoers is the purpose (telos) of the
criminal law.76 Otherwise the social fabric disintegrates.77

70

See id. at 1487, 1493.
See id. at 1486–87.
72
Id. at 1488, 1500 (“[T]he function of criminal law has everything to do
with embodied ethical life.”).
73
See id. at 1489.
74
Id.
75
See id. at 1489, 1529.
76
Id. at 1490–91. Professor Kleinfeld uses the metaphor of discipline in a
classroom to indicate the purpose of the criminal law. Id. at 1506. If violations of
the professor’s rules go ignored, and unpunished, then the entire social fabric disintegrates. See id at 1500. Thus, punishment reiterates the persistence of the order.
Id. at 1489–91.
77
Id. at 1500.
71
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The linchpin of that socio-ethical norm is the concept of solidarity. This word is extremely significant in reconstructive thinking:
it emphasizes how punishment’s purpose is to reiterate the shared
moral culture, because “it is shared, rather than solely because it is
right . . . .”79 The emphasis on solidarity stems from Hegel and
Durkheim’s empirical observation that humans are social beings and
that flourishing was contingent on social realities.80 Importantly, this
premise did not arise with either of those thinkers; rather, it is fundamentally Aristotelian,81 and as will be shown later, that is a key
premise of restorative retributivism.82
This social basis means that reconstructivism does not share the
predominant view83 that punishment is inherently evil, or always a
form of suffering.84 The corollary is that reconstructivism is not immediately skeptical of state power; better yet, it does not start from
the premise of limiting the power of the state in the wake of crime.85
Rather, the first question for the reconstructivist relates to the nature
of wrongdoing. This attribute is claimed as distinctive86 from typical
punishment theory:
78

[T]he question of how to understand crime is one part
of a larger question about how to understand wrongdoing in general. To understand wrongdoing is to
78

See id. at 1492.
Id. at 1492.
80
See id. at 1493.
81
See HONNETH, supra note 17, at 7, 11–30 (describing influence of Aristotle
on Hegel, and Aristotle’s beliefs that purpose of life was moral flourishing, human
beings are naturally social, and flourishing therefore requires a polis).
82
See infra Part III (noting how scholastic retributivists, such as Thomas
Aquinas, built from the Aristotelian premise that humans are naturally social and
political animals).
83
See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION 158 (J.H Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1996) (“[A]ll
punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil.”).
84
Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1497–98.
85
Id. at 1497 (referencing how retributivism and utilitarianism “give criminal
theory a libertarian cast”).
86
Restorative retributivism shares this trait: it sits within a larger moral
framework about wrongdoing because of its teleological roots. See Huigens, supra note 49, at 1435. Professor Kleinfeld references how modern retributivists
care about wrongdoing, but labeling that phenomenon as a late developing interest
seems mistaken. See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1497–1504.
79
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learn something about the response wrongdoing calls
for, which in turn implies a position as to what punishment is and what it is for.87
This understanding is fundamentally Hegelian, focusing on how
concepts and ideas manifest in real life.88 “Ideas” are concepts, actualized.89
The connection to the criminal law stems from the fact that
wrongdoing is the attempted de-actualization of the embodied ethical life, which is an “idea” in the Hegelian sense.90 Wrongdoing
threatens to re-label the predominant social reality false; hence,
“[w]rongdoing is communication.”91 This is why reconstructivism
goes beyond the modern harm principle when contemplating crime
and punishment:92 wrongdoing causes tangible and intangible harm.
That intangible harm cuts against the solidarity underlying social
conditions: “crime is [an] offense to embodied ethical life,” disturbing socially-derived norms to justify condemnation.93 Crime denies
the socio-moral claims of the law.94 It expresses disdain for the law
and social order underlying it.95 Failing to respond allows the crime
to usurp the socio-moral norm, or, as Professor Kleinfeld puts it,
“[C]rime declares: ‘[t]he norm . . . does not hold.’”96 Because those
norms are socially derived, crime is thus anti-social.97 For the reconstructivist, punishment in the wake of crime is pro-social.
This understanding of wrongdoing has particular implications
for victims, a development illustrated by Jean Hampton and Jeffrie

87

Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1498.
Id. at 1499 (citing G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF
RIGHT 25 (H.B. Nisbet trans., Allen W. Wood eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991)
(1821)) (“Philosophy has to do with Ideas and therefore not with what are commonly described as mere concepts.’”).
89
See id.
90
See id.
91
Id. at 1504.
92
See id. at 1501–02.
93
Id. at 1505.
94
Id. at 1512.
95
Id. at 1529.
96
Id. at 1506.
97
See id. at 1505–06.
88
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Murphy.98 Wrongdoing devalues victims within the prevailing social order99 and is an intangible harm in the form of an insulting
degradation of the victim that threatens to de-actualize the norm embodied in the victim.100 In short, it is a comment to destabilize the
social hierarchy, rejecting the social status of the victim.101 It is a
rejection of that victim’s actualized social place.102
Punishment, therefore, reiterates the social reality prior to the
transgression, reaffirming the “idea,” or the embodied ethical life.103
Its validity rests in its reaction to how wrongdoing disrupts the social
norm. Members of the community must respond in order to reiterate
the social order again.104 It is the counterproposal to the proposal put
forth by the wrongdoer to undo the social order.105 Punishment, in
true Hegelian form, is the synthesis after crime’s antithetical nature
disrupts the thesis within the social order.106 In summary, punishment responds to the “abstract norms or rights and a socially approved status structure or hierarchy.”107 It thus goes beyond individual harms, justifying its placement within public law.108 With respect to victims, the connection to publicly validated dignity is thus
apparent.
For the reconstructivist then, the goal of punishment is to “reconstruct a violated normative order in the wake of a crime.”109 It is
expressive, negating crime’s message and declaring the crime
98

See id. at 1500, 1507–09, 1516. Kleinfeld claims that Hampton and Murphy are reconstructivists. Id.
99
Id. at 1529.
100
MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra, note 15, at 25, 36–40. It is not clear to me
why this is not metaphysical given the transcendent nature of human relationships.
101
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1508 (noting how Murphy and Hampton
understood effect on victim psychologically, but not as a matter of social status).
102
Id. (“[S]ocial status is a socially given thing.”).
103
Id. at 1499 (“Punishment, in turn, re-actualizes the right, making it something ‘fixed and valid’ in the wake of a wrong.”).
104
See id. at 1505–06, 1529. As will be described in Part III, this sounds a lot
like natural law based human inclinations which, a priori, deserve our trust.
105
Id. at 1509 (“Society’s response makes the proposal, as a claim about the
social world, true or false.”).
106
See Günther Jakobs, Derecho Penal: Parte General, 18–19 (1995), as reprinted in LUIS E. CHIESA, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 2.03 (2014).
107
Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1509 (emphasis added).
108
Id. at 1512.
109
Id. at 1513.
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“untrue” as a social reality.110 To be clear, it does not undo the crime;
rather, the communicative content of punishment indicates that
wrongdoing does not represent the way things are or will be.111 Interestingly, this makes the reconstructive understanding of punishment fundamentally linguistic and symbolic, providing a “shot in
the arm” for those obeying the law.112 Accordingly, this makes reconstructivism less offender-centric, unlike retributivism.
Thus, reconstructivism contemplates what wrongdoing is, and
what crime is, before thinking about punishment. To put it in laymen’s terms, knowledge of what actually happened (in a sociomoral sense) must precede punishment in order for the latter to be
appropriate.113 Criminal law uniquely has the endeavor of helping
to revive the social order when it is “offend[ed], threaten[ed], and
undermine[d].”114 Crime tears the social fabric while punishment restitches it.115 Thus, criminalization and punishment are connected,
built on an ethical order derived from shared social bonds.116 And
that ethical order has political implications, tethering criminal law
to broader political philosophy117:
[T]he nature of criminal wrongdoing is that it violates and threatens embodied ethical life and the nature of punishment is that it restores and protects embodied ethical life in the wake of the crime. Punishment does so for the sake of social solidarity and because respect for the society’s normative order and
the worth of all persons, including both offender and
victim, demands it.118

110

Id.
See id. at 1513–14.
112
See id. at 1514–16 (noting how Durkheim understood punishment to restore faith of rule followers).
113
Id. at 1500 (“One cannot understand punishment as re-actualizing a norm
unless one first understands crime as de-actualizing the norm.”).
114
Id.
115
Id. at 1500, 1538.
116
Id. at 1502.
117
Id. at 1503–04.
118
Id. at 1524.
111
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For the reconstructivist, the function of criminal law and punishment
is to forge and re-forge the social order.119
II.
THE RECONSTRUCTIVE CRITIQUE OF RETRIBUTIVISM
Where does reconstructivism fit within broader legal theories, as
well as theories of criminal law and punishment? This Part discusses
how reconstructivism labels retributivism, before taking a deeper
dive into the type of retributivism used to compare both theories.
Reconstructivism claims to be the only theory that has something to say about “embodied ethical life and solidarity . . . necessarily present[ing] a theory of the nature of crime . . . [and] normative content atop a thick description of social life.”120 The word
“necessarily” does a lot of work in this description, as Kleinfeld is
careful to note that reconstructivism could be a “type of retributivism, utilitarianism, or expressivism.”121 After all, Hegel considered
himself a retributivist given the fact that punishment “re-actualizes
the right” that was infringed by wrongdoing.122 But in the end,
Kleinfeld opts for labeling reconstructivism as its own species, but
one that simultaneously conflicts with and affirms certain core
claims of the alternatives.123
One reason for this classification is that reconstructivism acts in
the Hegelian fashion described above for instrumental reasons, particularly to promote human welfare: Punishment “ensures that the
norms proposed by the wrong do not overtake social life.”124 Punishment has a function. This sets up a contrast between reconstructivism and Kantian retributivism, which is the version of retributivism juxtaposed with reconstructive thought. Whereas the Kantian
retributivist would execute the murderer on the island as a matter of
right and obligation (given the violation of the moral rule), the reconstructivist would, rightly, be concerned that doing so has no
119

Id. at 1523.
Id.
121
Id. at 1525.
122
HEGEL, supra note 88, at 127 (“The cancellation . . . of crime is retribution
in so far as the latter, by its concept, is an infringement of an infringement.”);
Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1499.
123
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1525.
124
Id. at 1526–27.
120
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instrumental effect on the sociality underlying punishment in the
first place.125 In other words, island executions cannot possibly contribute to human welfare because there is no function for punishment
to perform when no community exists to receive the message.126
Thus, we come to a key attribute of reconstructivism that distinguishes it from modern theories of punishment: it is teleological.127
This contrasts with Kantian deontological ethics underlying the
criminal law and punishment.128 For Kant, function has no place in
the analysis of justice; categorical imperatives abound, punishment
is mandated out of obligation.129 The teleological nature of reconstructivism stems from its rejection of the default, contemporary
philosophical posture requiring a “fact/value distinction.”130 For
Kleinfeld, the descriptive and normative are necessarily intertwined
in human thought and reality.131 The teleological and functional are,
therefore, connected; definitions contain standards of evaluation.132
Once we know what something is, we can assess whether that something is doing well at what it is.133

125

See id. at 1527.
Id. at 1527 (“When society disbands, there is no one left to receive the
message for which punishment exists.”).
127
See id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
See id. at 1534–35.
131
See id. at 1534–36. As discussed below, this is a position shared with teleological retributivism, which holds that human realities are both factual and moral
realities, such that total disentanglement is hard to accomplish.
132
See id. at 1536.
133
See id. at 1536. Kleinfeld describes a house as a structure that gives shelter.
Id. If the house “does not give shelter, it is a defective house, and if it is defective
to a sufficiently extreme extent, it might cease to be a house altogether,” becoming
something like a shack or abandoned structure. Id. Thus, function stems from essence. Id. (citing CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, SELF-CONSTITUTION: AGENCY,
IDENTITY, AND INTEGRITY 32 (2009) (“[E]very object and activity is defined by
certain standards that are both constitutive of it and normative for it.”)); Hilary
Putnam, The Entanglement of Fact and Value, in THE COLLAPSE OF THE
FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY AND OTHER ESSAYS 28, 30 (2002) (“[N]ormative judgments are essential to the practice of science itself.”); ROBERT B. BRANDOM,
MAKING IT EXPLICIT: REASONING, REPRESENTING, AND DISCURSIVE
COMMITMENT 5 (1994) (referencing how social practices provide normative
force).
126
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Whereas retributivism (as presented) focuses on moral wrongness and desert to determine what should be criminalized and how
punishment should be meted out, reconstructivism looks to “moral
culture” and the expressive nature of punishment.134 This distinction
grows from labeling retributivism as exclusively individualistic and
concerned with imposition of punishment out of duty, suggesting
retributivist callousness towards the socially devastating effects of
punishment.135 This understanding of retributivism is fundamentally
deontological.136 In contrast, reconstructivism takes aim at higher,
teleological purposes that are socially inspired, which also leaves
room for pluralistic functionality.137 Reconstructivism is presented
as having the longer view and de-mystifying the deontological system underlying Kantian retributivism: “[W]e have here a similarity
and a dissimilarity: reconstructivism, like retributivism, sees punishment as good or right in itself, but unlike retributivism, explains
that goodness or rightness in terms of human welfare.”138
Reconstructivism also purports to explain why punishing is required and why it is useful. Kleinfeld rightly notes how deontological retributivism cannot take account of the social consequences of
punishment, whether good or bad.139 “Reconstructivism can explain
why punishing Eichmann is an imperative of justice” and is good;
retributivism cannot.140 In modern terms, retributivism (so the critique goes) has nothing to offer to the problem of mass incarceration,
prison conditions, or collateral consequences, for the same reason.141 In sum, reconstructivism offers a communicative theory of
punishment that reiterates principles that are “morally and
134

Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1491–92.
Id. at 1496 (noting how retributivism does not address mass racial incarceration because individual desert is all that matters). The idea that retributivism
foolishly fails to take account of consequences it knows are likely to ensue has
been critiqued by Adam Kolber. Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of
Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 200–03 (2009).
136
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1527.
137
Id. at 1537.
138
Id. at 1527.
139
Id. at 1528. “Justice requires that we uphold the principle, and by upholding it we advance human welfare.” Id. As will be shown below, this is a cardinal
principle of teleological retributivism. See id.; Mark Tunick, Is Kant a Retributivist?, 17 HISTORY POL. THOUGHT 60, 67 n.38 (1996).
140
Id.
141
Id. at 1496.
135
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pragmatically essential to social life.”142 The knock on retributivism,
in contrast, is that it only speaks to the morally required, with no
consideration of the socio-moral component.143 Retributivism, it is
said, speaks to condemnation, but not the control-based function of
the criminal law, or the ripple effects of punishment on the broader
social fabric.144
Reconstructivism also purports to have a different focus with respect to human dignity than Kantian retributivism because it prefers
victims.145 Kantian retributivism disdains instrumental punishment
because it uses offenders contrary to their dignity and, in a way, obfuscates the notion of accountability underlying punishment and being conducive to honoring dignity.146 In contrast, “[r]econstructivism is oriented to the dignity of victims[,]” responding to the social
degradation caused by wrongdoing.147 According to Kleinfeld, this
works in reconstructivism’s favor because the deontological retributive notion that offenders are fully agential is empirically mistaken
given social conditions that impair judgment.148 Some who violate
the law are affected by social conditions, and punishment premised
on baseline equality in freedom, in spite of those social conditions,
overlooks a key issue in the justice of punishment. Kleinfeld
acknowledges deep moral complexity here, but claims retributivism
has no answer given its focus on addressing the act of wrongdoing,
and nothing else.149 As presented below, restorative retributivism is
cognizant of this moral nuance.150
142

Id. at 1528.
See id. at 1496.
144
Id. at 1500, 1542 (“Retributivism . . . speak[s] to one half of the duality.”).
145
See id. at 1531.
146
Id. at 1528–29.
147
Id. at 1529.
148
Id. at 1529 (noting how “agential capacities are damaged, and damaged in
morally complex ways”). Notably, restorative retributivism considers social conditions that affect the ability of the will to choose rightly as mitigating conditions
for punishment. See id. at 1529–30.
149
See id. at 1528–29, 1531.
150
Whether human beings can decipher and manage it is, of course, a different
question. But, whereas Kantian retributivism might wipe its hands and say “whatever,” teleological retributivism might have a humbler approach. See SKOTNICKI,
supra note 49, at 65 (describing pro-social, anti-alienation intentions beyond penitential punishment); Mary Sigler, Humility, Not Doubt: A Reply to Adam Kolber,
2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 158, 161 (2018).
143
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Kleinfeld offers a third distinction between retributivism and reconstructivism relating to the place of emotions. He claims retributivists contemplate “condemnatory emotions” as part and parcel of
the “sense of justice” demanded in the wake of wrongdoing.151 In
contrast, reconstructivists understand emotion as a socially developed response to wrongdoing; emotion undergirds punishment because emotion reflects the social bonds between members of a community.152 This social origin of punitive emotion is more valid because it is less vengeful; its sharedness makes it less personal, and
thereby less susceptible to manipulation because it is bounded by
the social order itself.153
In short, reconstructivism might be a relative of retributivism,
but not a partner. They both hold that justice “demands punishment
for wrongdoing.”154 But the split centers on functionality; deontological retributivism is act-centric. In contrast, reconstructivism,
built from social premises, is cognizant of the broader human welfare, but one that is socially and culturally constituted rather than
morally abstracted.155 This leaves room for different strands of reconstructivism across cultures,156 making the reconstructivist “a
criminal law relativist.”157 The customs of those cultures inform the
criminal law.158 Its teleological roots are unfixed. They are unfixed
because the Hegelian roots of reconstructivism contain a “moral
center” that mandates criminalization of extremely abhorrent behaviors contrary to “reason and freedom,”159 while refraining from

151

Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1530.
Id.
153
See id.
154
Id. at 1531.
155
See id. at 1530–31.
156
Id. at 1549 (“[R]econstructivism . . . accepts a kind of cultural relativism
with respect to criminal law.”).
157
Id. at 1557.
158
Id. at 1552-55. This is why Kleinfeld connects reconstructivism to Burkean
conservative thought and labels it democratic: “The state in the criminal context
should be the embodiment and protector of society’s lived moral culture – its way
of life. Edmund Burke would approve. If Burke were a criminal theorist, he would
be a reconstructivist.” Id. at 1543, 1555.
159
Id. at 1560. This moral center is fundamentally Hegelian in its relation to
the primacy of “reason and freedom.” See id. Which specific practices lie within
this moral center is not entirely clear.
152
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having the criminal law reach every vice.160 Reconstructivism also
cares more about victim dignity than that of offenders, although it
concedes that retributive side-constraints might be necessary to fully
protect offender dignity.161 In the end, reconstructivism is “pro-social” given that its usage of emotions has solidaristic roots rather
than abstract moral notions of desert.162 It is a socially restorative
theory of the criminal law, built from descriptive-normative premises.163
III.
RESTORATIVE RETRIBUTIVISM
As mentioned in the preceding parts, there are many versions of
retributivism.164 This Part argues that examination of non-deontological—or teleologically-minded retributivism with Aristotelian
roots—indicates that reconstructivism is not the only route for those
who view the criminal law as instrumental when it comes to social
welfare. In fact, restorative retributivism shares many of the traits of
reconstructivism, and arguably is its parent.165 At the very least, it is
a theory that has its own conception of wrongdoing that precedes the
nature of punishment, and it is cognizant of the broader social effects
of punishment in practice.
A.
The Roots of Restorative Retributivism
Like reconstructivism, restorative retributivism presupposes a
moral framework and understanding of political philosophy.166
160

Id. (“Because reconstructivism highly values embodied ethical life, . . . the
theory does not see every objectionable social practice as abhorrent.”). Interestingly, this resembles the limits of human law. Richard W. Garnett, Attempts, Complicity, Virtue, and the Limits of Law, in CHRISTIANITY AND CRIMINAL LAW 238–
39, 247, 249 (Norman Doe et al. eds., 2020).
161
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1499, 1528–29. This suggests that reconstructivism is not the fully relational theory of criminal law that it presents itself
to be, which is a point expanded upon in Part IV. See infra Part IV.
162
As will be shown in this Part, this comparison is entirely contingent on the
ruling out of a teleology underlying retributivism. See infra Part III. But if the
telos for human life intrinsically contains social affairs, then retributivism looks
as pro-social, if not more, than reconstructivism. See id.
163
See infra Part III.
164
See supra Part I.
165
See infra Part IV.
166
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1487, 1503, 1522–23.
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Aristotle is its most well-known philosophical forefather, with medieval thinkers developing his theories.167 The shared link to Aristotle means this version of retributivism shares roots with reconstructivism.168
The moral and political thought underlying this retributivism is
fundamentally teleological, building from Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia.169 Teleology underlies the moral concepts within this
thought and the meaning of political society.170 These understandings contrast sharply with a deontological retributivist like Kant, and
modern retributivists, who operate from individualistic and classically liberal premises that also accept the fact/value distinction.171
In contrast, eudaimonia is an inherently social concept, and what is
informs what should be.172 In the words of one scholar, it “requires
an extended concern for friends and for others in the political community because only that sort of concern will lead to a full development of one’s capacities and potential as a human being.”173
Aristotelian teleology holds that happiness (eudaimonia) is the
end of all human actions and the reference point from which the

167

See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 89–
90 (1988); CHRISTOPHER DAWSON, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF WESTERN
CULTURE 140-217 (1991) (describing Aristotelian influence in Middle Ages).
168
See MACINTYRE, supra note 167, at 89–90; DAWSON, supra note 167, at
140-217 (1991); Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1486, 1491; Zachary Hoskins, The
Moral Permissibility of Punishment, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.,
https://iep.utm.edu/m-p-puni/.
169
See ARISTOTLE’S “NICOMACHEAN ETHICS” 33–52 (David Fernbach trans.,
Otfried Hoffe et al. ed., 2010); KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 69–70; Ethics Explainer: Eudaimonia, supra note 56.
170
Some might label this conception of retributivism as “aretaic” as it accords
with virtue ethics. See, e.g., Kyron Huigens, On Aristotelian Criminal Law: A
Reply to Duff, 18 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 465, 468–69 (2004)
[hereinafter A Reply to Duff]; Huigens, supra note 49, at 1425. (“The law has a
purpose, an end in view, which is to promote the greater good of humanity. The
criminal law serves that end by promoting virtue.”).
171
KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 69–70; Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1534–
36.
172
KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 70, 85–86 n.36; Ethics Explainer: Eudaimonia, supra note 56.
173
Huigens, supra note 49, at 1445 (citing TERENCE H. IRWIN, ARISTOTLE’S
FIRST PRINCIPLES 393–406 (1988)).

2021]

RESTORATIVE RETRIBUTIVISM

879

goodness of actions should be determined.174 In other words, the descriptive reality of seeking happiness indicates a normative value by
which to evaluate the pursuit of that goal.175 And that goal is not
subjective; instead, it is objective and connected with moral and social realities. Why social realities? Because human beings are naturally social beings.176 That is a cardinal principle of Aristotelian philosophy.177 The social is contained within the moral significance of
actions. How do we know that happiness has social roots? The act
most capable of producing happiness—contemplation of God—is
rational and social because the subject of contemplation is Being (or
person in the Christianized version presented later by Scholastic
Christian thinkers); thus, contemplation presumes a relationship.178
Thus, the teleology underlying restorative retributivism leaves room
for the social within the moral.
As happiness is the end of all actions, those actions are evaluated
according to how they “contribute to [that] ultimate purpose.”179 But
happiness, as understood in this system, is not subjective.180 While
subjective considerations can inform the effect of an action, there
are some actions that are contrary to happiness altogether.181 How
the object of an act comports with the goal of life is how that act is
judged.182 This is one reason why punishment is not viewed as
174

See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. I of pt. II, question 1, art.
7 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. ed. 1947)
[hereinafter SUMMA THEOLOGICA].
175
See id.
176
Id. at pt. I of pt. II, question 61, art. 5.
177
See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 1253a7 (Peter L. Phillips
Simpson trans., Univ. N.C. Press 1997) (c. 350 B.C.E).
178
See ARISTOTLE’S “NICOMACHEAN ETHICS”, supra note 169, at 207 (describing contemplation as highest pursuit of happiness); SUMMA THEOLOGICA,
supra note 174, at pt. I of pt. II, question 2, art. 8.
179
KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 72.
180
Id. at 83.
181
See id. at 72, 76. This resembles the Hegelian moral center referenced by
Professor Kleinfeld when discussing the content and limits of the criminal law,
although its content is different given other first principles. Kleinfeld, supra note
16, at 1489 n.2, 1499 n.27, 1543.
182
This is one reason why the underlying moral philosophy remains teleological rather than deontological. See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1527. For example,
a prohibition on lying derives from the fact that lying hinders the liar’s ability to
develop character. See id. at 76.
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fundamentally evil in this tradition, although it is not viewed as necessarily good.183 The margin of its contribution to the good is situational.
The objective nature of happiness stems from an order that exists
eternally.184 Human beings apprehend this end by virtue of their capacity to reason—their existence as “rational agents” who are deliberative.185 That capacity is naturally ordered—personally and socially—and is the “rule and measure” of human behavior and the
basis of morality and politics.186 Observable and experienced human
inclinations and practices inform this idea.187 These principles cut
against a relativistic moral framework, although they are cognizant
of social realities in their application.188 Following natural inclinations in accordance with the object of happiness constitutes the
moral life.189 This has individual and social implications: a
“properly functioning human being” or community makes choices
that comport with the “inherent purposiveness in those inclinations
fundamental to human nature.”190 Humans are more than the sum
total of choices or acts, or the expressions of their freedom; they are
an integrated whole necessarily tethered to societal givens and freedom serves the good.191 This position counters the fact/value
183

SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 174, at pt. I, question 48, art. 6.
Id. at pt. I of pt. II, question 91, art. 1 (“Aquinas understands this to be the
“eternal law.”). Of course, Aquinas’ formulation is theologically informed. See
Floyd, supra note 52. Aristotle recognizes this order as fundamentally part of reality. Huigens, supra note 49, at 1447.
185
Huigens, supra note 49, at 1447.
186
KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 80–81.
187
Id. (“Simply stated, the natural law guides human beings through their fundamental inclinations toward the natural perfection that God, the author of the
natural law, intends for them.”).
188
See Manuel Velasquez et al., Ethical Relativism, MARKKULA CTR.
APPLIED ETHICS (Aug. 1, 1992), https://www.scu.edu/ethics/ethics-resources/ethical-decision-making/ethical-relativism/.
189
SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 174, at pt. I of pt. II, question 94, art. 2
(referencing the connection between natural inclinations and the natural law as
“reason”).
190
KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 84.
191
Huigens gives an analogy:
My horse has the ability to direct himself to cause external
events; he can act, in our modern, limited sense, voluntarily.
What he lacks, however, is the ability to conceive of himself as
184
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distinction because what should be intrinsically exists with what
is.192 Human identity is inextricably tied to the social.193 Thus,
awareness and knowledge of what is generally, and what the criminal law is and does, can allow for understanding something like the
purpose of punishment, and provide the grounds for critiquing a system that is in place. The criminal law and punishment, like the beings they purport to serve, subsist within a whole.
This teleological framework thus leaves room for an assessment
of function, and one cognizant of broader human welfare. Punishment is thus connected to a robust conception of the common good
that consists of “justice, law, friendship, the dignity of [humans],
and fraternal love.”194 As Peter Koritansky notes, this framework
critiques Kantian ethics by pointing to how that system “separates
morality from the ultimate good for man.”195 Thus, the philosophical
system within which restorative retributivism resides—or to use
Professor Kleinfeld’s terminology, is “nestled”—takes stock of the
broader social good.196 Functionality is baked into the telos underlying restorative retributivism.197
Specifically, this approach holds that social relationships, communities, and societies are fundamentally natural and a constituent
element of measuring human action.198 This is in direct contrast to
persisting through time, or as being possessed of certain capacities that can be developed to a greater or lesser extent, or as a
member of a society, or as having a final good that depends on
all of these things and more. My horse, in short, lacks the ability
to shape a life into a satisfying and adequate whole.
Huigens, supra note 49, at 1447–48.
192
KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 85; Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1534–36.
193
See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 84, 90.
194
Lee J. Strang, The Role of the Common Good in Legal and Constitutional
Interpretation, 3 U. ST. THOMAS. L.J. 48, 55 (2005).
195
KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 85.
196
Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1549, 1556–57; Huigens, supra note 49, at
1426 (“[T]he criminal law cannot avoid the question of the good.”); A Reply to
Duff, supra note 170, at 485 (noting how the features of a theory of punishment
are the assumptions, arguments, and ethics upon which the theory draws).
197
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1491, 1522–23.
198
See THOMAS AQUINAS, COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS 18 (Richard J. Regan trans., 2007). Koritansky describes how his view of Aquinas on this
point differs from contemporary philosophers like John Finnis. KORITANSKY,
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Kantian and classical liberal systems that contemplate human societies as ventures in social contract with otherwise atomistic individuals.199 The distinction makes all the difference for the institution of
punishment. That is because political society has the capacity to aid
the moral well-being of individuals and itself.200 Political community, by virtue of being social, illustrates the connection between the
moral and the social.201 The function of a community is to help individuals live well.202 And the function of law is to promote the common good.203 After all, the definition of law offered by those who
developed Aristotelian thought is that law is a rule of reason, promulgated by a legitimate authority, ordered toward the common
good.204 Thus, punishment necessarily has a social component and
necessarily must be cognizant of the common good. The criminal
law is “purposive.”205 This thinking lays the groundwork for a restorative retributivism that is aware of social consequences rather
than turning a blind eye to the consequences of punishment.
B.
Restorative Retributivism and Punishment
Restorative retributivism holds that punishment is simultaneously bad and good because it is a type of harm suffered by rational
supra note 21, at 88–89, 93–94. Whereas Koritansky’s reading attributes the idea
that societies are natural to Aquinas, resembling Professor Kleinfeld’s observation
that social realities are “socially given,” Finnis’ view seems to be that human beings construct communities for “instrumental” purposes, but built from certain
inherent goods. KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 87 n.39, 89, 91–94; Kleinfeld,
supra note 16, at 1508, 1518 Even if Finnis’ view is the right one, it would seem
to move teleological retributivism even closer to reconstructivism, given the reconstructivist emphasis on human participation in forming social realities. See
KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 87 n.39, 89, 90–93.
199
See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 68–69, 85.
200
JACQUES MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD 29 (1st paperback ed.1966) (“Because the common good is the human common good, it includes . . . the service of the human person.”).
201
See id.; KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 90.
202
KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 90.
203
Id. at 97 (“[T]he virtue of legal justice is primarily directed to the common
good to a political community.”).
204
See SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 174, at pt. I of pt. II, question 90, art.
2; ARISTOTLE’S “NICOMACHEAN ETHICS”, supra note 169, at 83.
205
Strang, supra note 194, at 194 (noting how law is a “purposive instrument”).
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creatures against their will but is also necessary to restore order.206
It is thus concerned “not only with responsibility,” but with making
both the person punished and society better.207 Punishment thus
aims to “restor[e] . . . the equality of justice.”208 By its orientation to
an order of justice, punishment has a function.
This theory of punishment recognizes a communicative component as well. Punishment communicates by (1) restoring order; (2)
reaffirming that the act was wrong; (3) promoting future compliance; (4) redressing the hurt caused to victim(s); and (5) acknowledging the responsibility and value of the offender.209
Criminal punishment is permitted only in the wake of crime, and
crime presupposes wrongdoing. Thus, teleological retributivism has
an understanding of the nature of crime and wrongdoing that precedes punishment. Fault is a precondition for criminal punishment.210 Punishment can simultaneously be experienced as an evil
by the one suffering it and a good “from the point of view of the
institution inflicting it.”211
The moral basis for punishment rests in the natural inclinations
constituted within individuals and social communities permeated by
a natural, social order.212 Thus, the “natural inclination to punish” is
about the common good rather than private vengeance or some
206

See SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 174, at pt. I, question 48, art. 5;
THOMAS AQUINAS, ON EVIL 75–79 (Brian Davies ed. Richard Regan trans.,
2003); AUGUSTINE, On the Free Choice of the Will, in ON THE FREE CHOICE OF
THE WILL, ON GRACE AND FREE CHOICE, AND OTHER WRITINGS 3–4 (Peter King
ed. & trans, 2010).
207
Huigens says it this way: “We are concerned here not only with responsibility, but also with virtue.” Huigens, supra note 49, at 1449. A full development
of how punishment can help to develop virtue is beyond the scope of this Article.
Professor Huigens has argued that such a connection can exist. See Huigens, supra
note 49, at 1449. Andrew Skotnicki has argued that Augustine and Thomas Aquinas developed this idea. See Skotnicki, supra note 49, at 796 n.16, 797 (referencing Thomistic anthropology that allows for the development of virtues).
208
KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 105.
209
See infra notes 126–130.
210
See Antony Duff & Andrew von Hirsch, Responsibility, Retribution and
the “Voluntary”: A Response to Williams, 56 CAMBRIDGE U. PRESS 103, 105–06
(1997).
211
KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 109.
212
SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 174, at pt. I of pt. II, question 87, art. 1
(“[W]hoever sins, commits an offence against an order: wherefore he is put down,
in consequence, by that same order, which repression is punishment.”).
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deontological command.213 Threats to the common good must be
addressed, lest the common good, and the shared inclinations upon
which it rests, be undermined.214 These inclinations are not to be
confused with vengeance.215 Rather, they are tethered to the nature
of things, particularly the nature of human beings as “rational
agents” and their experienced reality.216 They also form the basis for
boundaries that limit punishment.217 They are the moral center underlying punishment.218
How is this different from Kantian retributivism or modern-day
retributivism? Teleological retributivism views desert as corresponding to the degree of transgression of the “order of . . . justice.”
219
It focuses on the harm that has occurred, the nature of the offense,
the blameworthiness of the offender,220 and their connection to
213

See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 110.
KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 110 (“[S]o also the natural inclination to
punish criminals directs us to preserving the common good by retaliating against
those who threaten it.”).
215
See Kyron Huigens, On Commonplace Punishment Theory, 2005 U. CHI.
L.F. 437, 441 (2005) (referencing how deontological retribution, while influential,
has never been dominant and that retribution has been “chronically misconstrued
as vengeance”).
216
Huigens, supra note 49, at 1447. This is a really important point, and one
perhaps confusing to the modern retributivist or utilitarian. Aquinas holds that
“fundamental natural inclinations and the natural goods they cause us to desire
are to be trusted.” KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 121.
217
Id. at 112 (“[A]nger becomes sinful when it desires the punishment of ‘one
who has not deserved it, or beyond his deserts, or again contrary to the order prescribed by law, or not for the . . . maintaining of justice and the correction of defaults.”) (quoting SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 174, at pt. II of pt. II, question
158, art. 2); see also SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 174, at pt. I of pt. II, question 46, art. 6 (referencing how anger is connected to desire for justice, in contrast
to hatred).
218
See id. at 128–29.
219
SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 174, at pt. I of pt. II, question 87, art. 6
(“[T]he act of sin makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as he transgresses
the order of divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of
penal compensation, which restores him to the equality of justice . . . This restoration of the equality of justice by penal compensation is also to be observed in
injuries done to one’s fellow men.”).
220
A focus on blameworthiness is not an exclusively philosophical concept.
See J.M.B. CRAWFORD & J.F. QUINN, THE CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS OF
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING 1–3
214
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norms tethered to the common good.221 This content of desert is how
this version of retributivism is simultaneously formed and flexible.
Philosophical reasoning informs the first two attributes (harm and
the nature of the offense); social facts and natural inclinations (or
community sensibilities that are shared) inform the latter two attributes.222 This is why it is simultaneously retributive and restorative.
Punishment is both reactive—required by wrongdoing to set
things right—and functional—to repair.223 One medieval thinker
noted that punishment is like “medicine . . . healing the past sin, but
also preserving from future sin, or conducing to some good.”224
Thus, punishment has a restorative character and preventive character, but the functional considerations are byproducts of the required
desert. Punishment is therefore individually tailored and socially
oriented.
The restorative character of punishment within restorative retributivism deserves more explanation. What precisely allows punishment to be restorative? First, punishment responds to an “overindulgent will” on the part of the offender.225 The offender attempts to
violate the order of justice by rejecting it. That is bad on two counts:
one for the community and one for the offender. Punishment, therefore, is justified in part by its intrinsic relationship to an “order”
within which humans reside together.226 Accordingly, punishment
serves as a correction to reset the order that was transgressed.
But lest one think that this resembles Kantian individualism, in
reality, the correction is geared towards more than the individual
will of the offender; rather, it is designed to address the “inequality
(1991); Mitchell N. Berman, Introduction: Punishment and Calpability, 9 OHIO
J. CRIM. L 441, 443–44 (2021). Christian moral teaching has emphasized it for
centuries. See id..
221
See Strang, supra note 194, at 55.
222
See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 110. Huigens puts it this way: “[T]he
criminal law operates on the basis of thick norms: detailed, context-specific prohibitions that have an organic relationship to human history and the human situation, and that are cognate with moral norms.” A Reply to Duff, supra note 170, at
498.
223
See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 105.
224
SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 174, at pt. I of pt. II, question 108, art. 4.
225
KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 105.
226
Huigens, supra note 49, at 1456 (“The ends one ought to have is the special
concern of the criminal law.”); KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 135.
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that comes about as a result of the crime.”227 Thus, punishment is
simultaneously offender and order centric, cognizant of a particular
individual’s relation to and violation of that order. As Koritansky
puts it: “When a kidnapper is deprived of his freedom by being imprisoned, the harm he suffers against his will balances his willful
transgression of the law and assault upon on the common good.”228
In other words, within this form of retributivism, punishment has an
expressive component by addressing the defect from which society
suffers by virtue of the individual’s action.229 But that expressive
component stems from the retributive nature of punishment to
start230—the purpose being the correction of the order that was attacked by individual wrongdoing. That is a good related to the common good: “[t]he punishment . . . expresses and reaffirms the political community’s indignation at the crime committed and solders
that commitment in the minds of potential criminals whose moral
future still lay undetermined.”231 There is purpose behind the punishment, including denouncing the act, reiterating the moral order,232 and pushing the individual to something better.233
That contrasts sharply with Kantian retributivism that views
punishment as an obligation, irrespective of purpose.234 Punishment
is mandatory regardless of its relation to the good; the obligation to
punish comes from the violation of a universal maxim.235 Hence, the
bloodlust on the island makes sense because there is no principle
guiding the exaction of punishment; there is only a command to do
it. Thus, the Kantian retributivist loses sight of the social consequences of punishment or really any notion of human goods.
Another way teleological retributivism differs is with respect to
the famous Kantian lex talionis, which has been criticized as

227

Id. at 124.
Id.
229
See JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY 213–
14 (1998) (discussing how crime and wrongdoing offend the common good).
230
KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 109–10.
231
KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 162.
232
SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 174, at pt. I of pt. II, question 87, art. 6.
233
See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 161.
234
Id. at 125.
235
Id. at 125, 127 (“For Kant, punishment is not, strictly speaking, a good to
be pursued. It is simply right or just.”).
228
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justifying horrific punishment practices.236 The idea that punishment should be exacted in the same form as the crime itself seems
barbaric, not to mention impossible to carry out for certain types of
crimes. All of this stems from the Kantian obsession with addressing
the act that violated universal maxims.237 Further, as many have said
before, deontological retributivism suffers from an abstraction and
application problem: many moral philosophers disagree on the
quantity of desert required, thereby rendering such a system impracticable.238 But teleological retributivism need not suffer this fate.
Because the focus is the overindulgent will, how it violated the order, and the quality of that violation, rather than the sheer nature of
the act, punishment can be meted out in different ways. What matters for the calculation of desert is the seriousness of the crime and
the offender’s culpability as it has impaired the common good, and
the degree of punishment should correspond to what is necessary to
restore the order of equality that existed before the crime.239
“Deservingness” is grounded in a notion of the common good,
naturally and socially informed, and mindful that equality is necessarily linked to justice.240 To be fair, restorative retributivism is trafficking in non-empirical knowledge here. But punishment relates to
the moral integrity of the political community, and the natural and
social realities within that community inform that moral fabric.241
Those realities are not entirely quantifiable. But interestingly, this
philosophical commitment jives with modern research that has detected how communities and individuals can comprehend moral nuance when it comes to deserved punishment.242 The forefathers of
236

See id. at 130.
See id.
238
Chad Flanders, Retribution and Reform, 70 MD. L. REV. 87, 100 n.79
(2010).
239
See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 131 n.46 (referencing how Aquinas
emphasizes culpability when identifying degree of desert).
240
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1526.
241
See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 159.
242
See Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in
Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1832–80 (2007) (summarizing research); see also Alexis M. Durham III, Public Opinion Regarding Sentences for
Crime: Does It Exist?, 21 J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 2 (1993) (“Virtually without exception,
citizens seem able to assign highly specific sentences for highly specific events.”);
237
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restorative retributivism and the proponents of empirical desert are
certainly not one and the same; nevertheless, the findings of those
in support of empirically based notions of desert complement the
premise of teleological retributivism that human inclinations about
punishment are discernible, shared, and can inform the measure of
punishment.
C.
Restorative Retributivism and Human Law
While restorative retributivism presumes a natural order that
punishment should conform to,243 what does that mean for human
law? Because this form of retributivism is a theory of criminal law
within a broader moral framework, it is important to realize the conception of law within that framework. For a teleological retributivist, human law is necessary given the under-determinate nature of
the natural law. Humans thus become partners in constructing the
order of justice, making “particular determination[s] of certain matters.”244
This is an important point that certainly distinguishes teleological retributivism from something like the lex talionis system proposed by Kant.245 While punishment necessarily follows from the
order of justice, the system leaves room for human beings to determine the mode of punishment. Human beings making that assessment, of course, should be simultaneously mindful of the order of
justice and concrete realities within a particular political community.246 Thus, we reach another way that restorative retributivism
Robinson & Darley, supra note 34, at 35–36 (“The conclusion suggested by the
empirical evidence is that people take account of a wide variety of factors and
often give them quite different effect in different situations. That is, people’s intuitions of justice are not vague or simplistic, as claimed, but rather quite sophisticated and complex.”). This can be compared with the focus of scholars within
the Aristotelian tradition, such as John Finnis, who focused on the reality that
human beings share an interest in certain finite goods. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL
LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 64–69, 100–126 (1980) [hereinafter NATURAL LAW
AND NATURAL RIGHTS].
243
KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 169.
244
SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 174, at pt. I of pt. II, question 91, art. 3.
245
KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 164.
246
Robinson & Darley, supra note 34, at 9 (“fitting with modern studies that
show “people widely share intuitions about whether a given offense is more or
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exists within a political philosophy: by introducing the “prudence”
of the decision-maker. As Koritansky writes, “[P]rudent legislators
(or judges) may . . . impose differing punishments according to the
various contingencies with which they are faced.”247 More recently,
when critiquing the difficulty with applying retributive theories of
punishment, Chad Flanders has described how an institutional understanding of desert is warranted, focusing on who decides and how
decisions are made.248
But those determinations about the kind of punishment are not
freewheeling. Rather, they remain tethered to the moral center underlying the theory itself. Prudent decision-makers have liberty to
determine the shape of punishment,249 but it cannot be shapeless,
and the essence of punishment itself cannot be undermined. Punishment must correspond to the basic function of law—promotion of
the common good—and cannot frustrate that purpose. The kinds of
punishment must be both functional and teleologically ordered.
Thus, restorative retributivism has built-in constraints; but within
those parameters, human creativity can be utilized.250
But aren’t there limits to what human beings can know about
culpability and the seriousness of crime? Absolutely yes, although
modern social science has demonstrated that remarkable consistency exists across cultures—and amongst laypersons—when it
comes to calibrating punishment—an interesting validation of the

less serious than another offense, but people and societies may disagree about
what the punishment for the most serious offense will be.”); Robinson & Kurzban,
supra note 242, at 1837–1858 (detailing studies showing remarkable consistency
regarding rank ordering and nuance in punishment).
247
KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 140.
248
Flanders, supra note 238, at 130–31. Flanders proceeds to reference John
Finnis’ work on determination, “a process of choosing freely from a range of reasonable options none of which is simply rationally superior to the others.” See id.
at 125 n.214 (citing Finnis, supra note 49, at 103).
249
See Flanders supra note 238, at 108.
250
Koritansky interestingly uses the metaphor of a house to describe this idea.
See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 141. The punishment is the house, but the
exact shape of the house is up to human determinations. See id. But essential components of the house, like a door, cannot be so out of bounds (like a one-foot-high
door) that it undermines the essence of the house itself. See id. Note how similar
this is to Professor Kleinfeld’s discussion about the fact/value distinction. Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1534–36.
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teleological retributivist’s core supposition that a moral core exists.251
That said, consistency does not necessarily mean those intuitions
are correct, and a punishment regime in a liberal democratic order
tends to look more to “reasoned judgments” than common intuitions.252 Interestingly, restorative retributivism accounts for the
modern critic’s concern with heuristics and cognitive biases by recognizing the limits of human capabilities. The function of punishment is necessarily under-determinate given moral complexity.253 In
terms of administration, this means decision-makers strive to ascertain the proper degree of punishment correlating to the order of justice that was violated.254 Interestingly, this line of thinking arguably
made Thomas Aquinas—a Christian thinker who developed the Aristotelian roots described above—cautious when it came to inflicting capital punishment.255 Because there was uncertainty as to what
justice required for such a serious crime and in particular circumstances, Aquinas shifted the locus of the decision to a philosophical
discussion about public safety and imminent threats.256 James Whitman, in his masterful work on the theological roots of the reasonable
doubt rule for juries, has illustrated how a similar principle advocating for choosing the safer way (when adjudicating difficult cases of
guilt or innocence) characterized decision-making about crime and
punishment in the pre-modern world.257 This suggests cautious
251

See Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 242, at 1831–40 (discussing laypersons’ intuitions of justice).
252
See Robinson & Darley, supra note 34, at 8 (noting how belief that wrongdoing should be punished is intuitive rather than reasoned and how that fact has
implications for policy questions).
253
See Huigens, supra note 49, at 1468 (referring to “indeterminacy of Aristotelian virtue”).
254
See Dena M. Gromet & John M. Darley, Restoration and Retribution: How
Including Retributive Components Affects the Acceptability of Restorative Justice
Procedures, 19 SOC. JUST. RSCH. 395, 400 (2006) (discussing social science research).
255
See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 160 n.160, 164–65.
256
See id. at 100, 164–65.
257
Whitman, supra note 48, at 87–90 (discussing medieval theology that suggested humility in adjudication and its reemergence in late 1700s). Whitman refers to trial transcripts from the 1700s to show that this way of thinking persisted.
Id. at 87, 91; see Old Bailey Proceedings Online, 3 June 1789, Trial of John
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humility in human decision-making for more serious crimes, and
perhaps for all crimes.
This approach leaves room for mercy258 that is anathema to
Kantian retributivism;259 restorative retributivism, recognizing the
multifaceted nature of the good, and thereby wrongdoing, evaluates
more than the external act itself. Moreover, there are limits to the
capabilities of human punishment, and society would be wise to emphasize its medicinal character—for individuals and communities—
rather than its punitive side.260 Thus, restorative retributivism accounts for the reconstructive nature of punishment, nods to humility
in application,261 and leaves room for the modern ideal of a selfgoverning, democratic, community.262

Shepherd (t17890603-43), https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/browse.jsp?name=
17890603; see also Old Bailey Proceedings Online, 3 June 1789, Trial of George
Green (t17890603-14), https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/browse.jsp?name=
17890603 (defendant was capitally punished within a month of being convicted
of violent theft and highway robbery). To be fair, Whitman’s main argument is
that choosing a safer path was designed to protect judges, not defendants, out of
concern for the decision-maker’s soul. Whitman, supra note 48, at 92. Whitman
traces this thought from Saint Augustine to the 1700s. See id. at 98. For example,
Ambrose, when discussing whether judges should be permitted to communion in
the Church, suggested that judges should tend towards mercy in their decisionmaking. See Whitman, supra note 48, at 92 n.18 (describing influence of moral
theology on concept of “reasonable doubt”); Albert W. Alschuler, Justice, Mercy,
and Equality in Discretionary Criminal Justice Decision Making, 35 J. L.
RELIGION 18, 22 (2020) (referencing how mercy can serve as an enhancement of
“earthly justice” deemed necessary).
258
See Alschuler, supra note 257, at 22.
259
See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Punishment, Forgiveness, and Mercy, 35 J. L.
RELIGION 5, 14 (2020) (referring to Kantian views combined with humility in
one’s attitude while meting out punishment).
260
SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 174, at pt. I of pt. II, question 87, art. 3.
261
Murphy, supra note 259, at 11 (quoting Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F. 3d 144,
152 (7th Cir. 1995). Murphy quotes a dissenting opinion by Judge Posner that
powerfully illustrates why humility is necessary to ensure human dignity in punishment: “We must not exaggerate the distance between ‘us,’ the lawful ones, the
respectable ones, and the prison and jail population; for such exaggeration will
make it too easy for us to deny that population the rudiments of humane consideration.” Phelan, 69 F. 3d at 152.
262
See A Reply to Duff, supra note 170, at 484.
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IV.

COMPARING RECONSTRUCTIVISM AND RESTORATIVE
RETRIBUTIVISM
How do these two theories of criminal law compare? It seems
there are two possibilities: (1) restorative retributivism is actually
reconstructivist, or (2) reconstructivism is a socio-centric version of
this retributivism, making them relatives.263 If the latter, the common root (or parent) is a return to teleological thinking264 in punishment,265 with the key distinction being the reconstructivist’s openness to relativistic criminal law because of its emphasis on the social
fabric.266 A discussion of their similarities and differences can potentially illuminate the answer to the taxonomical question.
First, each theory emphasizes that the criminal law and punishment are fundamentally teleological endeavors.267 Both exist for a
purpose, and the key question is identifying what that purpose is and
should be. And that purpose is not exclusively tangible, such as the
utilitarian purpose of promoting the public safety.268 The difference
seems to lie with the source for the telos.269 Whereas the restorative
retributivist locates purpose in metaphysical reflection on human nature, moral realities built from some observation, and moral positions held in common, reconstructivism emphasizes the purely social realities, and what can be normatively deduced from empirical
social realities.270 This enables the reconstructivist to arguably be
more pluralistic,271 but perhaps dangerously relativistic. On the flip
263

In either instance, restorative retributivism holds that punishment was necessarily connected to teleology first. See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1533–34,
1537.
264
See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 72.
265
See id. at 133 (describing punishment in retributivism as a means of repressing those who “rise up” against man); Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1488 (explaining that punishment “defends and reinforces” a fragile social good).
266
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1488, 1500.
267
See id. at 1490, 1523.
268
See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 100, 102.
269
Kleinfeild, supra note 16, at 1490–91.
270
See id. at 1522–23.
271
Id. at 1527, 1533–34, 1536–38. It seems that reconstructivism is built from
the idea that social facts are observable and tangible, such that the norms reified
by the criminal law are grounded in empirical reality. See id. Of course, the idea
that labeling facts tangible or observable makes them objective and neutral is contentious. Walter B. Kennedy, Principles or Facts?, 4 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 59
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side, the restorative retributivist has to answer against charges of
non-demonstrable, metaphysical principles and less flexibility in the
joints.272
With that said, it would be a mistake to think that both theories
do not contain first principles based on observing the realities of human affairs.273 Reconstructivism is descriptive and normative, and
so is restorative retributivism.274 Both theories rest on the observation that human beings are naturally social actors, which is not even
a question, having been empirically verified for ages.275 They are
both children of Aristotelian thought in this regard, thereby presuming the reality and necessity of the integrated polis.276 Thus, both
theories presume that crime is fundamentally anti-social and that
punishment, as a response to crime, is pro-social and necessary to
repair the social fabric.277
Both recognize that the criminal law is simultaneously purposeful and functional. The purpose for punishment is the same as its
justification. The criminal law is then downstream from moral and
social reality. But for restorative retributivism, the basis of criminal
law is not exclusively social affairs.278 Human law represents an attempt by a legitimate authority to apply morally true norms to concrete situations, mindful of social circumstances, and cognizant of
the common good.279 But this theory is not as ground up as
(1935). As Walter B. Kennedy once said, facts can be “just as elusive and nimble
as principles and rules.” Id.
272
This might be up for debate amongst Aristotelian scholars. For example,
my sense is that Alasdair MacIntyre argued persuasively that applying Aristotelian virtue ethics does not look the same in all places, such that social realities can
alter what it means to concretely and practically live a virtuous life. See Christopher Stephen Lutz, Alasdair Chalmers MacIntyre, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL., https://iep.utm.edu/mac-over/. This seems embedded in the Aristotelian
conception of practical reason as the essential ingredient on the path to eudaimonia (happiness in virtue). Ethics Explainer: Eudaimonia, supra note 56. AS
such, restorative retributivism could fit within a liberal regime, even if it is not
wholly of it.
273
Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1521–23.
274
Id. at 1490, 1521–23.
275
Id. at 1493 n.11.
276
Id.; HONNETH, supra note 17, at 7, 11–30.
277
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1500, 1505–06.
278
Id. at 1491–92.
279
See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 125–26.
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reconstructivism. The reconstructivist, on the other hand, recognizes
law as fully downstream from culture born of freedom.280 The social
order that the reconstructivist purports to serve with law determines
the content of that law; it does not have other sources, which it likely
considers too mystical to comprehend should they go beyond tangible expressions of freedom.
Nevertheless, both theories have a rich understanding of what
the law and punishment purport to serve.281 The reconstructivist
points to human welfare, again tethered to socially-derived
norms.282 The restorative retributivist looks toward a robust notion
of the common good, which is a concept developed by thinkers for
the past two millennia.283 The common good essentially means
achievement of the objective human good held in common, and on
an individual and societal level, that is necessary for human flourishing.284 That is a confluence of natural law-based virtue and social
realities,285 and it could mean different practical ends for different
communities. But there is a moral core that derives content from
more than social relations. That is a marked distinction from the reconstructivist, whose moral center is determined by social realities,286 and thus, open to being relativistic across cultures.
The moral center within both theories also allows for an understanding of the nature of wrongdoing (crime), which then informs
the response (punishment).287 For the restorative retributivist, crime

280

See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1528–29.
See id. at 1488 (explaining that punishment serves to defend and reinforce
a fragile social good); KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 133 (describing punishment
in retributivism as a means of repressing those who rise up against man).
282
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1526–27.
283
KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 125–26 (detailing Aquinas’s understanding
that punishment serves to preserve the common good).
284
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book 1, § 2 (c. 350 B.C.E)
[http://classics.mit.edu//Aristotle/nicomachaen.1.i.html] (“For even if the end is
the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events
something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve; though it
is worthwhile to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to
attain it for a nation or for city-states. These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry aims, since it is political science, in one sense of that term.”).
285
KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 109.
286
Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1512.
287
See id. at 1502.
281
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is an offense against the natural moral order,288 whether automatically apparent in the case of malum in se offenses,289 or in the case
of human created crimes, an attempt to determine how that order
applies in concrete social situations. It is also indicative of an individual’s failure to pursue the right ends as communicated by the
criminal law,290 in addition to subverting the social order.291 Thus,
like reconstructivism, restorative retributivism has an understanding
of crime that precedes the content of punishment.292
Both theories also conceive punishment as a direct response to
the violated order.293 This is why both theories hold that punishment
is necessary and is one reason why reconstructivism seems to be a
socio-centric theory of desert. It arguably is a kind of retributivism,
particularly retributivism that contemplates crime and punishment
as teleological endeavors. But the reason for the response is also
why reconstructivism might be its own species of teleological punishment theory. This is because the reconstructivist’s grounds for
punishment are fundamentally human and descriptively social;294
they are not meta-ethical, although they might be metaphysical in
the sense that they are intangible principles reflected in the social
order. The difference seems to lie in the understanding of the
grounds for desert.
This is the crux of the taxonomical question. While the reconstructivist conceives social affairs as dictating the terms of criminal
law and punishment,295 does the reconstructivist think that those social affairs are entirely determined by human will? If any are socially
given, beyond human creation, and dictated by the very nature of
sociality, in the sense that they are connected to some natural,
288

See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 105.
See id. at 104; Richard L. Gray, Eliminating the (Absurd) Distinction Between Malum in Se and Malum Prohibitum Crimes, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1369, 1370
(1995).
290
See R.A. DUFF, THE REALM OF CRIMINAL LAW 37 (2018) (explaining that
the “concept of the criminal law,” or what makes it distinctive, is its expression
of community condemnation); Sandra G. Mayson, The Concept of Criminal Law,
14 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 447, 449 (2020).
291
Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1529.
292
Id. at 1505–06.
293
See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 107.
294
Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1498–99.
295
See id. at 1519, 1523.
289
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metaphysical reality beyond human control, then reconstructivism
seems to be a strand of teleological retributivism. The grounds for
desert really are more than the social—desert is how the social reflects a moral order of which human freedom is a part, but not determinative.296 But if the reconstructivist conceives punishment as a
response to an attack on the exclusively human-created social system,297 then reconstructivism operates from a different first premise:
the idea that while human beings are naturally social, none of the
elements of that sociality are beyond their control (or put differently,
humans are fully free to shape social realities),298 and at the very
least, only the ones that are observable should inform punishment.299
This anthropological difference is crucial.
Perhaps that makes sense because the social is more observable,
or because autonomy is the preeminent value in liberal society. And
in a democratic republic, empirical observation is the language of
policy debate.300 And the social purports to make criminal law and
punishment seem more about relationships,301 and the social fabric
that binds us.302 But the idea that the reconstructivist more richly
comprehends the relational nature of criminal law than the restorative retributivist seems misplaced.
Remember that reconstructivism views punishment as a response to an attack on the social order.303 That social order is the
idea—to use the language of Hegel—that needs “reaffirming.”304
Restitching previously existing harmony is the objective.305 This
sounds nothing like relationship. In fact, it sounds a lot like the
world of concepts, and abstract ones at that. It seems like the individual (remember how the reconstructivist shies away from the
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See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1525–26.
See id. 1506, 1512–13, 1525.
298
See id. at 1499, 1538.
299
This key distinction is also why reconstructivism seems closer aligned with
liberal theories of justice that presume the social contract as the origin of society.
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, 1488–89.
300
See id. at 1553–54.
301
See id. at 1522–24, 1553–54.
302
Id. at 1500.
303
See id. at 1489–90, 1525–26, 1529.
304
Id. at 1489–90, 1529.
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See id.
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condition of the offender)306 could get lost in this framework because, after all, how the response addresses the social discord created by the crime is what matters. The right precedes the good.307
Couldn’t reconstructivism be just as callous to individuals as the
Kantian retributivist in this regard?308 The reconstructivist cares
about reaffirming maxims socially derived and normatively worthy
of retaining.309 But what matters is the holding up of the norm, not
the individuals involved.310 It sounds very close to the cold qualities
of Kantian retribution that modern critics detest.311 Deontological
duty gets replaced by solidarity (and the concept thereof), which is
the priority.312
In contrast, restorative retributivism, by having a notion of individual right and wrong that informs social considerations, seems to
be in a position where it can tailor punishments more uniquely to
individuals.313 Kleinfeld says Kantian retributivism is offender-centric.314 That seems a bit off; rather, it seems to be offense-centric,
focused entirely on the nature of the offense and nothing else.315 Restorative retributivism is actually offender and offense-centric, in
that it discerns the individual consequences for the offender, and the
social consequences that punishment will have for victims and the
broader community.316 This style of retributivism is significantly
different than reconstructivism in that it takes stock of the social, but
does not over-prioritize it.317 It situates punishment within a broader
306

See id. at 1497–98, 1514, 1516, 1520, 1523–24, 1529, 1531.
Huigens, supra note 49, at 1436 n.43. Huigens has emphasized how this is
the fruit of Rawlsian political philosophy informing the criminal law. Id. (noting
how modern philosophers of the criminal law operate within a deontological and
liberal paradigm that “seek[s] a fair arrangement of society . . . defer[ring] the
question of the good”).
308
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1529.
309
Id. at 1490.
310
See id.
311
See id. at 1527.
312
See id. at 1527 n.119, 1546–47, 1549, 1560–61.
313
See id. at 1528–29.
314
See id. at 1527–29 (“Retributivism in the Kantian tradition is not teleological but deontological: part of its identity consists in rejecting means-end thinking.”).
315
See id.
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See id.
317
See id. at 1530.
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moral framework, naturally and socially determined, that also takes
individual goods into account.318 Restoration is the fruit of retribution tethered to the situation of the individual and the needs of the
community.319 In contrast, the reconstructivist emphasizes the social, which could lead to some perverse results depending on the
social framework underlying the criminal law, not to mention historically-driven social realities and inequities.320
Another way of describing this style of retributivism is that it is
personalist.321 The criminal law and punishment thus operate to
serve the development of persons, both individually and within the
community.322 As Rick Garnett has mentioned, such an account emphasizes “character, dispositions, projects, vocation, habits, and habituation. It asks not only ‘what was done?’ or ‘what came about
and by whom?’ but also ‘what sort of person did this?’”323 Zooming
in on the personal—and its relation to the social—is ground for a
318

This is consistent with the idea that conceiving appropriate desert is possible and not altogether mystical. See Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 242, at
1835; Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1508, 1526; see also JOHN KLEINIG,
PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 114 (1973) (“What follows from [attempts to exactly
define desert] is not the absurdity of specific desert claims but only the absurdity
of expecting them to function like statements of empirical quantity.”). “Ordinal
ranking” is feasible once an endpoint for the most serious offense is determined.
Robinson & Darley, supra note 34, at 34 (“[O]nce a society sets the endpoint of
its punishment continuum, the ordinal ranking of cases along that continuum will
produce quite specific punishments.”).
319
Interestingly, R.A. Duff has lauded this type of restorative justice achieved
via retribution. R.A. Duff, Restorative Punishment and Punitive Restoration, in
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND THE LAW 82 (Lode Walgrave ed., 2002) (“Our responses to crime should aim for ‘restoration’, for ‘restorative justice’: but the kind
of restoration that criminal wrongdoing makes necessary is properly achieved
through a process of retributive punishment.” (emphasis added)).
320
Another way of thinking about this is as follows: the restorative retributivist has an argument against egregious systems of criminal law that stem from
egregious social practices and norms. See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1547, 1550.
The reconstructivist has a harder time responding to that situation, which is why
it seems Professor Kleinfeld concedes that retributivist constraints might be necessary to rein in reconstructivism in social circumstances. Id. at 1529 n.122.
321
SMITH, supra note 42, at 406–08.
322
See id.; Huigens critiques instrumental explanations that fail to view a person as “a full moral agent, with her own scheme of ends, her own talents and
abilities, her own strengths of character, and so on.” Huigens, supra note 49, at
1438.
323
Garnett, supra note 160, at 239.
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richer notion of the meaning of punishment and its aiming towards
flourishing, leading to criminal law that serves and restores rather
than imposes and inflicts.324
V.

RESTORATIVE RETRIBUTIVISM AND THE CURRENT CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM
If restorative retribution is an alternative to reconstructivism, or
other theories of punishment, its application to modern problems of
criminal justice is a test of its viability. The above sections communicate that this theory’s core is about purpose.325 In particular,
the purpose behind punishment is connected to human flourishing:
without that tethering, punishment can become reckless, degrading,
other-creating, and undermine itself.326 This, I propose, is why restorative retributivism is fundamentally personalist and relational:
the social nature of punishment—its effects on the broader community and the punished individual’s ability to rejoin that community—is of the utmost concern.327 The purpose of punishment can
simultaneously be appropriate retribution and preparation for reintegration when the development of individual and social well-being
underlies the entire project.328 As Bill Stuntz put it, punishment can

324

See SMITH, supra note 42, at 406–08; Flanders, supra note 238, at 87 (assessing the connection between punishment theory and practice). Of course, there
can be a disconnect between an aspiration or ideal and practice. See Flanders,
supra note 238, at 87.
325
Supra Parts I–IV.
326
See Murphy, supra note 259, at 15.
327
Skotnicki, supra note 49, at 799 (referencing historical Church teaching as
suggesting that “rehabilitation of the offender and his or her eventual reincorporation into the ecclesial social body is the goal of punishment”).
328
Winston Churchill, Home Secretary, Speech Delivered to House of Commons (July 20, 1910), in WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES:
1897-1963, VOLUME II: 1908–13, at 1598 (Robert Rhodes James ed., 1974) (“The
mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of crime and criminals
is one of the most unfailing tests of the civilization of any country . . . [This civilized attitude includes] unfaltering faith that there is a treasure, if you can only
find it, in the heart of every man.”).
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be viewed as “sometimes necessary but always [potentially] dangerous,” demanding caution when exercised.329
This results in a key similarity with reconstructivism and a key
difference that matters in terms of application. Whereas both theories—given their concern with the social fabric—are inherently
democratic, reconstructivism tends towards instillation (or re-installation) of custom.330 Deference is shown to the way the things are or
have been. For the reconstructivist, this is a great benefit because, in
the words of Kleinfeld, it is Burkean.331 Radical change is not the
work of the criminal law. Criminal justice reform is therefore likely
to be piecemeal, the work of “supermajorities rather than simple majorities”, and the reconstructivist is “skeptical of projects in social
reform by means of the criminal law.”332
Restorative retributivism, by contrast, seems to have the capacity—perhaps paradoxically given its historical roots—to be more
countercultural in the current moment. By its nature, reflective on
human nature, it goes to first principles rather than first practices.333
That is because its core invites a moral reflection that goes beyond
social realities.334 Its nestling inside a broader theory of law—again
mindful of telos and the common good (that goes beyond public
safety)335—and its connection to the idea of virtue and flourishing336
suggests the criminal law has the capacity to affect social reform,
while not being the primary catalyst. Perhaps it is accurate to say
that the restorative retributivist believes there is more that the
329
STUNTZ, supra note 2, at 55; see also Murphy, supra note 259, at 15 (noting
how humility “will incline those who would punish to see this not as something
to be celebrated but as something to be done with great regret and always with a
sense of loss and disappointment, always open to the possibility that the offender
has failed us because to some degree we have failed him.”). Whitman makes a
similar point about pre-modern approaches to criminal law and punishment,
where the awesome spectacle of punishment was viewed as necessary but also an
expression of sorrow in the community. Whitman, supra note 48, at 84–85.
330
Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1552 (“[I]t follows that criminal law must
begin in custom and maintain its connection to custom.”).
331
Id. at 1555.
332
Id.
333
See Flanders, supra note 238, at 97–98.
334
Id. at 103–04.
335
See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 100, 102; Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at
1549, 1556–57.
336
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, 1493–94, 1532.
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criminal law can do—not in terms of more criminalization—but in
the sense that the criminal law, as it currently operates, leaves much
to be desired.337
Thus, the core contribution of the restorative retributivist in this
moment is that she demands an accounting of what our system does,
why it does it, and whether it accords with a robust and deep sense
of human flourishing rather than a thin one focused exclusively on
quantifying crime rates, the costs of jail time, and how to engage in
social control en masse.338 That is ambitious, aspirational, and reorienting.339 But it also comes with a dose of humility about the project
of the criminal law, such that the criminal law and punishment do
not become the antidote to social ills better addressed by other systems of law or private actors.
What does this mean for some of the current issues facing the
criminal justice system, such as mass criminalization and incarceration, the encroachment of the criminal law onto the civil law, the
conflict between punitive and therapeutic interventions for substance users,340 plea-bargaining and the decline of the jury trial,341
recidivism,342 the social consequences of incarceration on families343 and communities, and the effect of public criminal records on
reentry?344 While a full accounting is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth mentioning some of the questions that a restorative
retributivist might ask when confronted with modern day criminal
practices.
Given its Aristotelian roots, it is likely the case that this line of
thought would find the significant enlargement of the criminal
337

See STUNTZ, supra note 2, at 55 (discussing pathological politics of criminal law).
338
See Stephanos Bibas, Forgiveness in Criminal Procedure, 4 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 329, 329 (2007).
339
See Flanders, supra note 238, at 104, 110–11.
340
See Murphy, supra note 259, at 16 (describing punishment as a last resort
to deal with drug problems).
341
Gramlich, supra note 2.
342
Recidivism, NAT’L INST. JUST., https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/corrections/recidivism (last visited May 15, 2021).
343
Eric Martin, Hidden Consequences: The Impact of Incarceration on Dependent Children, NAT’L INST. JUST., May 2017, at 1–3.
344
Re-Entry, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/smart-justice/re-entry (last
visited May 15, 2021).
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law—and corresponding sentences in the wake of conviction—a bit
puzzling.345 For an Aristotelian is primarily concerned with the habituation of virtue, not social control.346 Whether the three felonies
that many Americans potentially commit every day under the federal code347 have any connection to the development of virtuous
character is a legitimate question. The core of criminal law once
communicated the behaviors most thought deserving of punishment;
the norm today is an overbroad criminal law that makes convictions
easy to achieve via plea bargain.348 In addition to the heightened severity of punishment, its frequency is off the charts as a break from
American history,349 and the incarceration of racial minorities is astronomical.350
That is not to say that this theory only conceives of a criminal
law with malum in se prohibitions; rather, it asks whether the criminalization of a particular behavior really does get at the core of who
we are, and what is necessary for people to develop right habits and
good character. That is not to encourage lawbreaking. Certainly, the
breaking of “minor” laws is disruptive to the law overall. Rather, it
is to encourage serious consideration about where the criminal law
should stop, and where other behavior-shaping forces make more
sense.
It also would probably view the modern criminal law’s practice
of letting most charges originate with a few discretionary decisions
by insiders as problematic. Because of its cognizance of the social
elements of the criminal law and punishment, the very acts of the
state associated with enforcement of the criminal law should be social.351 Jury trials were initially conceived as opportunities for the
exercise of moral responsibility by the community,352 but now are
relegated to the sidelines as most cases are adjudicated via plea345

See A Reply to Duff, supra note 170, at 468.
Id.
347
HARVEY SILVERGATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS TARGET
THE INNOCENT (2011).
348
STUNTZ, supra note 2, at 39.
349
See id. at 47-50 (noting how frequency of punishment is astronomical, even
if drug cases are removed from the statistics).
350
Id.
351
Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1522.
352
WHITMAN, supra note 48, at 146 (“[J]ury trial was the scene of complex
drama of moral responsibility.”).
346
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bargaining.353 As such, they were a check on the defendant, impulses of the community, and professional prosecutors.354 Widespread charging by information, without any sort of normative check
by the community, makes that more difficult.355
While restorative retributivism has a goal in mind for punishment, it leaves open the mode for accomplishing that goal. Again, it
operates from the standpoint that punishment is necessary but easily
abused.356 This is one manifestation of its fixed yet flexible nature:
parameters and considerations are present, as is wiggle room in the
joints. When the boundaries are clear, creativity (consonant with
dignity) can flourish.357 The under-determinate nature of law leaves
room for human discretion and decision-making, reflective of how
a form of punishment accords with the underlying restorative purpose of punishment. It also is open to critically assessing the “American tendency to deal with crime simply by adding more years on to
oppressive mandatory sentences . . . .”358
This, of course, is not easy work. Tailoring punishment lends
itself neither to mathematical formula nor natural instinct. Rather, it
requires practical reason and a dose of humility that does not aim to
be too ambitious. As Koritansky puts it, “[T]o inflict a punishment
that hinders the basic function of human law or frustrates the purposes of the institution of punishment itself would constitute a violation of the natural law the same as having no institution of punishment at all.”359 Human-designed punishment should redress disorder, communicate what is right and good,360 and aim to make people
and institutions better. That is what makes this form of retributivism
353

Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731, 733–35 (2010) (discussing history of jury trial, Sixth Amendment right, and how its reemergence
could disrupt plea-bargaining norms).
354
Id.
355
See Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 319, 358 (2012) (detailing how modern system addresses
lower-level crimes with little community involvement).
356
Flanders, supra note 238, at 128–29.
357
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, 1508.
358
Murphy, supra note 259, at 15.
359
KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 141 (emphasis added).
360
Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397,
402 (1965) (communicating very well, perhaps better than those who fall into the
restorative retributivism camp, that “punishment has a symbolic significance.”).
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restorative rather than control-based.361 It is participative, personal,
and open to forgiveness.362 Punishment solely for the purpose of
promoting public safety,363 or to be cost-efficient,364 is inadequate
to the name because it misreads the human condition. It not only
sells the individual short;365 it deprives society of a possible participant in the common good in the long run.366 Ensuring peace, improving individuals, and improving the community are symbiotic
goals.367 Punishment is not about settling scores between offender
and victim; rather, it is about the relationship between the offender
and the broader community of which she was, is, and will continue
to be a part.368 It is reparative369 and retributive. A knee-jerk, default
policy of incarceration is too overbroad, wreaks devastating consequences on communities,370 and undermines the entire purpose of
the criminal law. This is especially true in a democratic society that
disproportionately incarcerates certain groups.371
Where does humility come into play? Given the epistemic difficulty in knowing, with absolute certainty, the quantity of desert
361

See Bibas, supra note 338, at 342.
See id. at 329 (noting how current system expends “little effort to understand, heal, or reform offenders”).
363
See KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 100.
364
See Kleinfeld, supra note 16, at 1496, 1532.
365
This is because the theory holds that the criminal activity giving rise to
punishment was not only anti-social, but anti-individual, in the sense that the person has harmed him or herself. See id. at 1505–06, 1512.
366
See Murphy, supra note 259, at 14.
367
KORITANSKY, supra note 21, at 142. Augustine said punishment is “for his
own good, to readjust him to the peace he has abandoned.” Saint Augustine, The
City of God, Book XIX, in THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH 225, 225–26 (Gerald G.
Walsh & Daniel J. Honan trans., 1954).
368
Skotnicki, supra note 49, at 802 (referencing how pre-modern theories of
punishment conceived offenders as still part of the community, as “members of
the ‘body’ in an organic sense”).
369
Id. at 132 (“[T]he truest reparation is to be reacquainted with one’s best
self.”). Skotnicki argues that this version of retributivism is liberating and provides the ground for the development of restorative justice procedures. See id. He
cites Brathwaite for this idea. Id. at 132 n.22, 33 (citing JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION 5 (2002) (noting how the
Catholic Church’s confessional rites are restorative justice)).
370
The effects of parental incarceration on children, for instance, comes to
mind. Martin, supra note 343, at 1–3.
371
STUNTZ, supra note 2, at 13.
362
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demanded by a particular situation, decision-makers should strive
for punishment calibrated to culpability and the circumstances of the
offender. Jeffrie Murphy refers to this as the virtue of “attention.”372
Paying careful attention to detail about culpability and social circumstances can breed humility about what is deserved because an
“attempt to see in a good light what appear to be a person’s bad
qualities . . . is an important kind of humility.”373 It also will likely
lead to revelations about luck and its effect on the plight of someone
encountering the system, undermining righteousness and self-deception in those who hand out punishments.374
Humility of this sort permits erring on the side of under-punishment because, as mentioned above, the catastrophic costs of overpunishment are worth avoiding lest punishment’s utility be completely undermined.375 If punishment is meant to be reparative, risking additional disruption to society, the community, and the offender
through over-punishment is a serious concern.376 That suggests that
absolute confidence in the justice of the death penalty, mandatory
minimums for drug offenders, lifetime collateral consequences, or
other well-known harsh penalties that are ultimately criminogenic
and breed recidivism probably is a step in the wrong direction.377
That could conflict with deference to strict democratic principles or
the total democratization of the criminal law.378 But the restorative
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See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Humility as a Moral Virtue, in HANDBOOK OF
HUMILITY: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND APPLICATIONS 19, 22–23 (Everett L.
Worthington, Jr., Don E. Davis, & Joshua N. Hook, eds., 2017).
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See id. at 24 (discussing how “it is all too common for those who have not
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375
See id. at 30.
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See id. at 339.
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See STUNTZ, supra note 2, at 4–5 (discussing how “[d]iscretion and discrimination travel together”).
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retributivist is a friend to constrained discretion mindful of broader
purposes, accompanied by realistic humility.379
David Garland has persuasively articulated how penal institutions transformed into instruments of aggravated social control rather than institutions with environments built to help individuals get
better.380 Criminal justice has become impersonal; but that conflicts
with moral intuitions because “crime has a human face,” and the
system should reflect it.381 The meaning of imprisonment in the mid
to late twentieth century changed.382 If imprisonment is the mode by
which disorder from crime will be addressed (and there is no reason
to think that it won’t be, at least for the time being),383 then the purpose of the prison is worth thinking about. Its historical origin—
connected to penitentiaries and similar institutions focused on repair,384 rather than controlling the dangerous like cogs in machinery385—suggest revitalization of the environment within prisons is
sorely in order. But that probably requires a different sort of anthropology or basic understanding of the human condition. As Fyodor
Dostoevsky said, “the degree of civilization in a society can be
judged by entering its prisons.”386
379

STUNTZ, supra note 2, at 5 (noting how American criminal justice became
too deferential to official discretion, ultimately permitting unequal application of
the laws to particular communities, resulting in discriminatory law enforcement).
380
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381
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382
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383
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The restorative retributivist would replace the language of
“risk”—pervasive in discussions of the criminal law these days and
undoubtedly conducive to the “other-ing” of offenders—with
“worth.”387 The same analysis could apply to the notion that diversionary programs are always good for offenders, when in reality
they have the capacity to perpetuate if not enhance control.388 In
short, do we primarily understand human beings negatively as risk
creators or positively as capable of good?389
It would seem that restorative retributivism leaves room for the
empowerment of victims, but not in an unconstrained way. Jean
Hampton has articulated how the criminal law validates the plight
of victims.390 Because restorative retributivism is cognizant of the
individual offender’s well-being and the common good, it leaves
room for practices that involve victim forgiveness.391 Giving a victim “the power to forgive”—and thereby constrain the state so that
it does not overpunish—helps to rectify any “power imbalance”

387

See Skotnicki, supra note 49, at 814 (citing Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan
Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and
Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 457, 468 (1992)). This is because the Aristotelian tradition prioritizes the development of character, not mitigating potential bad acts. See ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS 29–32 (2001).
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E. Lea Johnston & Conor P. Flynn, Mental Health Courts and Sentencing
Disparities, 62 VILL. L. REV. 685, 693 (2017) (unpublished manuscript) (finding
that mental health court sentences were significantly longer than potential punishments); see Collins, supra note 7, at 1581, 1591, 1603; see also Skotnicki, supra
note 49, at 815 (“[T]he architects of social control have utilized many of the elements of the decarceration movement such as drug-testing, electronic monitoring,
and intensive probation as surveillance mechanisms . . . .”).
389
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approach to the issues within criminal justice. Skotnicki, supra note 49, at 814
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history and subjective interpretations, and defined in terms of risk”) (citing Feeley
& Simon, supra note 387 at 457, 468); see also Murphy, supra note 259, at 15
(referencing how prisons should be an environment that will be “truly rehabilitative and will provide opportunities for people to become better”).
390
See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 15, at 36–42 (discussing proper definition of forgiveness).
391
See id.
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created by the initial crime.392 Some studies also suggest it has a
secondary effect of limiting recidivism.393
Given the Aristotelian focus on the local polis, restorative retributivism would prioritize local governance when it comes to the
criminal law, but again with the objective moral constraints underlying the theory.394 Stuntz, in The Collapse of American Criminal
Justice, demonstrated how the historically intended local administration of the criminal justice system has been replaced by a disjunctive political situation where the voters electing officials have
little experience with crime in their own communities.395 This undermines the credibility of the justice system and likely exacerbates
racial disparities in policing and the experiences of individuals interacting with the criminal justice system.396 Locally minded, democratic, and relational criminal justice can be more lenient and less
discriminatory than centralized and bureaucratized criminal justice.397 As Stuntz put it,
Anyone who has been the victim of a serious crime
knows the desire to see perpetrators punished that
seems to be part of our nature. At the same time, all
those who have seen neighbors’ sons behind bars, or
their own, know the agony incarceration imposes on
local communities. Local political control over

392
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394
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STUNTZ, supra note 2, at 21 (describing how suburban voters elect officials
who make decisions for communities most affected by crime). “[V]oters in safe
places elect the officials who shape criminal justice in dangerous ones.” Id.
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Id. at 21–22.
397
See id. at 31 (referencing history of local administration of justice that,
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criminal justice harnesses both forces without giving
precedence to either.398
Placing power to make decisions in the hands of those most affected
by the falling and rising rates of crime can reduce agency costs and
empower individuals to do what is good for their particular community.399 At the same time, that discretion, totally unconstrained, can
be easily manipulated, leading to perverse results.400
What about treatment of those who have been convicted after
they have served their sentences? In other words, does this theory of
retribution have anything to offer to those suffering under the weight
of collateral consequences or permanent damage to their reputations? The answer would seem to be yes. Because of its relational
core, how a wrongdoer is perceived after encountering the system
must account for the complicated web of relationships central to that
person’s well-being. Rachel Barkow has written about how perceptions of convicted individuals after punishment differ significantly
from perceptions before trial.401 That empirical reality jives nicely
with the reintegrative aspirations of this theory, again designed to
improve the situation of the offender through and after punishment,
meaning punishment must end. As others have remarked, “continued [governmental] publicity is simply punishment without end.”402
CONCLUSION
The goal of this Article is to situate reconstructivism next to an
older theory of retributivism. Where reconstructivism lands taxonomically really depends on how the reconstructivist understands
social relations. If they are truly human constituted, and not given at
all, then reconstructivism is not a theory of retributive desert. But if
they are informed by moral realities, then the social is really just part
of the moral; and restorative retributivism has already accounted for
that, in both its purpose and function for criminal law and
398

Id. at 36.
Id. at 39 (“Make criminal justice more locally democratic, and justice will
be more moderate, more egalitarian, and more effective at controlling crime.”).
400
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401
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402
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punishment. Reconstructivism thus becomes a socio-centric version
of restorative retributivism.
Does this taxonomical question have a bearing on policy questions? Perhaps, and they would need to be worked out in concrete
detail. But the better position seems to me to be that both theories
have a lot more to offer public policy debates than those operating
solely along utilitarian lines. Losing the concept of a telos—whether
individual or socially defined—is one reason why the trains have
run off the tracks when it comes to criminal law and punishment.
The reconstructivist rightly emphasizes the social, reminding
those tasked with the criminal law and punishment to keep in mind
how both institutions relate to the social fabric. And the restorative
retributivist brings necessary reflection on the normative—beyond
human constructed social affairs—that makes the criminal law personalist rather than abstract. These are considerations any just system of criminal law should wrestle with when it comes to any policy
decision because they go to the very nature of living in a community.
Lay intuitions of justice conflict with the wave of American criminal
justice politics that has led to incapacitation run amok.403 And they
underlie the public’s desire for real, personal justice from the criminal justice system. In short, whether siblings, cousins, or just distant
relatives, reconstructivism and restorative retributivism can be partners in restoring the expressive aspects of the criminal law, helping
to re-stitch the social fabric,404 and contributing to human flourishing. As both teach us, a criminal law that does not pursue those goals
is a criminal law without a purpose.
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